From Mastery to Mystery by Bannon Bryan E.;

Author:Bannon, Bryan E.;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Ohio University Press

I. THE BEHAVIOR OF NATURE

The main problem that Merleau-Ponty seeks to address in his early work on nature is that of the limitation of the possibilities for thinking about the organization of nature into either a mechanistic whole—one whose identity lies in the aggregation of its individual parts—or a vital whole—one whose identity lies outside the natural processes themselves. In The Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty suggests that the idea of behavior will allow science to overcome the impasse between those who see life as nothing more than a fixed set of physiochemical phenomena and those who see life as something essentially distinct or emergent from physiochemical phenomena. What the examination of behavior yields that is so novel is that neither account of natural existence can explain behavior without either leaving certain phenomena unaccounted for or giving rise to certain paradoxes that are insurmountable from within the presuppositions of the original metaphysics. To describe these arguments in sufficient detail would lead us away from our current questions, however, and so we will focus simply upon the ventured solution to the original antinomy structure. In the notion of structure, Merleau-Ponty believes that he has discovered a way of resolving the antinomy between mechanism and teleology in the same manner that Kant resolved the three antinomies in the Critique of Pure Reason, by uncovering the prethetic ground upon which each alternative is constructed and showing why the two alternatives are themselves asking their questions in the wrong way. Vitalism and mechanism share the common assumption of “realism,” meaning that they both take everything that occurs and exists to be a cause of some sort. This version of realism is in turn possible only on the basis of a substance-based metaphysics, which has been the object of criticism throughout this book. Merleau-Ponty’s early hope is that a formalist metaphysics, that is, an ontology based on relations that accepts structures as real, but not existing as things, will substitute for the metaphysics of substance (SC, 142–43/132). The move away from a substance-based ontology will undermine the antinomy between mechanism and teleology, between traditional forms of materialism and intellectualism, by showing how there are “real” elements to our experience that are not constantly present in the manner of a thing. In this tendency to redefine realism and what it means to be a material body, Merleau-Ponty has much in common with contemporary materialists inspired by Deleuze—such as Isabelle Stengers, Jane Bennett, and Latour himself.

In his early work, Merleau-Ponty relates form and structure quite closely to the concept of system. Form exists wherever there is a system that meets two conditions: one, that a change in any of the constituent parts alters the properties of the system as a whole; and, two, that if there is a change in all the parts of the system, then the proportions of the relations between the parts are maintained, thereby maintaining the properties of the system throughout the change (SC, 50/47). In this way, a form is a “total process”

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