Fire Support In The Pusan Perimeter by Major John D. Dill

Author:Major John D. Dill [Dill, Major John D.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781786252210
Barnesnoble:
Publisher: Normanby Press
Published: 2015-11-06T00:00:00+00:00

Chapter 4 — DOCTRINE, TRAINING, LEADERS, ORGANIZATIONS, MATERIAL and SOLDIERS

The structure of the force deployed to Korea in 1950 ordained many of the shortfalls and successes displayed in the Pusan defense. Leaders should use the lessons learned from that force to shape the current and future U.S. military. The Army has divided the process of shaping the force into six areas: doctrine, training, leaders, organizations, material and soldiers. (DTLOMS){51} The Pusan battle has lessons for each of these areas.

Eighth Army was decisive as part of MacArthur’s overall plan for a mobile defense. Perhaps the value of Walker’s defense to current doctrine is best reflected by the choice of the Pusan Campaign to represent decisive defensive operations in FM 3-0. The manual describes an area defense as:

“…A type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright. The bulk of defending forces combine static defensive positions, engagement areas, and small, mobile reserves to retain ground. Keys to successful area defenses include effective and flexible control, synchronization, and distribution of fires into engagement areas. Area defenses employ security forces on likely enemy avenues of approach. Commanders employ a reserve with priority to the counterattack. Other potential reserve missions include blocking enemy penetrations and reinforcing other portions of the defense. Area defenses can also be part of a larger mobile defense.”{52}

Walker’s plan and execution of it illustrates this definition perfectly. However, in contrast to the Pusan perimeter’s value to current doctrine, contemporary doctrine gave little assistance to the soldiers of 1950.

After World War II, the American Army immediately convened a conference of artillerymen in Augsburg, Germany to discuss the lessons learned from the European Theater of Operations (ETO). The consensus from this conference was that World War II had validated U.S. Army doctrine, and the only change required was for more and bigger guns. The cannoneers recommended increasing the number of guns in a battery from four to six, and adding 155mm howitzer battalions to the DivArty. However, the Army took little action between the conference and the Korean War on even these minor changes. They also ignored any lessons learned in the Pacific Theater. The campaigns against the Japanese in World War II had many similarities with the Pusan defense. These included an enemy that preferred encircling tactics; extremely close support of American infantry, constricted terrain and frontages, and the need for organic perimeter defense by individual batteries.{53} Institutionalizing the lessons from the Pacific could have saved lives and guns in the Pusan Perimeter fights. However, there was little motivation to do this. As Boyd Dastrup described the period:

“Ambivalence characterized the field artillery late in the 1940s. Field Artillery officers saw no real reason to modify doctrine because of the successes of World War II and moved methodically to introduce new weapons. After all, during the late 1940s, most Americans, including many field artillery officers, questioned the role of ground forces in the atomic age and envisioned airpower as the key in defending the country.

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