Fire Support Employment In The Rhine River Crossing At Remagen, Germany by Major Jeffrey L. Shafer

Author:Major Jeffrey L. Shafer [Shafer, Major Jeffrey L.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, United States, Europe, General, Germany, Special Forces
ISBN: 9781786253606
Google: RDtvCwAAQBAJ
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
Published: 2015-11-06T05:06:58+00:00

In addition to the fires of the corps artillery, the 32d Field Artillery Brigade was placed in general support reinforcing the fires of the III and VII Corps Artillery from positions west of the Rhine. V Corps Artillery was to furnish maximum reinforcing fires as requested by the III Corps Artillery in support of the bridgehead and was to position at least one battery of 155 MM howitzers to prevent, by direct fire downstream, any attack on the Remagen bridge by floating craft. VII Corps Artillery was to maintain suitable amounts of artillery west of the Rhine and north of BONN to accomplish necessary interdiction fire on routes for reinforcement and supply into the bridgehead area.{56}

The artillery plans, prior to the capture of the bridge, had called for a gradual turn of the axis of advance to the south. III Corps Artillery’s mission was to relieve First Army Artillery, and take over their mission of interdicting SINZIG and Remagen; possible enemy crossing sites. The priority of effort was to be directed on the west bank of the Rhine River. The plan for interdicting the Remagen area had called for only a limited number of guns and furthermore, corps artillery did not have photomaps of the east bank of the Rhine since operations there were not included in the plan.{57} In fact, when news of the crossing came, the Corps FDC and all battalion command posts were displacing forward. An order was immediately sent by radio to all battalions to proceed to new locations from which they would be able to support the Corps operations east of the Rhine River. The corps and corps artillery were given high priority on artillery, aircraft, and ammunition.

“Few targets appeared, but the corps artillery policy of keeping heavy weapons well forward paid excellent dividends. By the night of 7 March, this corps was able to have one light, two medium and two heavy battalions of artillery, exclusive of the 9th Armored Division Artillery, in firing positions supporting the Remagen bridgehead.”{58}

The new plan called for the corps artillery to place heavy interdiction fires around the entire bridgehead. Effective control was accomplished by the 9th Armored Division Artillery commander, who coordinated the activities of all artillery in close support of the infantry fighting in the bridge area. With all attachments, this consisted of nine light battalions and three medium battalions of the 9th and 78th infantry Division Artillery and the 9th Armored Division Artillery. The lit Corps Artillery FDC controlled the remainder of the artillery which consisted of a total of eight light battalions, five medium, and eight heavy battalions.

On a March, the Army’s 32d Field Artillery Brigade was attached to the corps artillery. This artillery brigade consisted of the 79th FA Group Headquarters, the 266th FA Bn (8” GUN) the 551st FA Bn (240MM GUN) and The 552d FA Bn (240MM HOW). The 987th FA Battalion, a 32d FA Brigade battalion which had previously been attached to the 1st Infantry division, was attached to the 406th FA Group.

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