Executing Truth by Weierter Stuart;

Author:Weierter, Stuart;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: undefined
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing
Published: 2012-06-15T00:00:00+00:00

Weber and his Method

I turn now to the ideal-types, and the debates surrounding them. These debates show us, on one hand, a Weber who constructs the ideal-types in order to guide the formation of hypotheses (see Weber 1949, 90). For, as Weber (1949, 92) says, ideal-types are a means not an end. And, on the other hand, they show us a Weber in closer relation to Heinrich Rickert’s (1986) ‘value-metaphysics.’ Here it’s argued that Weber, in not fully departing from Rickert, holds still to his theory of concept formation, in which historical individuals are distinguished by the different meaning or value they ascribe to things.[6] Following this argument, ideal-types fall short. For they connect us back to a reality defined only by concepts. As such, the scientific value of ideal-types would be essentially worthless, for they would serve merely to elucidate what is essentially another species of ideal-type.

Somewhere between the two is correct, as I will argue. For neither of these can meet Weber as Weber. I will take up these arguments following, on one hand, the writings of Drysdale, and, on the other hand, the thought of Oakes. These are worthwhile representatives of each side, considering that – as I will argue – the former takes seriously Weber’s ideal-types as he understood them methodologically; while the latter explores the theoretical coherence of the ideal-types, especially in relation to everyday understanding. I hope to show that the former, in adhering to the boundaries of Weber’s method, cannot encompass the question, and ensuing problem, of what Weber could understand of everyday reality. In encompassing this impossibility of understanding the everyday, though, I argue that the latter surpasses Weber’s own methodological intentions. Bringing these two perspectives together, I suggest that it is not the theoretical problem which concerns Weber, but the personal or political. Keeping this in mind, it is important to consider Weber’s apparent reticence to explore his own theoretical presuppositions (as hinted at by Habermas).

First up is Drysdale (1996). Drysdale argues that Weber did indeed transcend Rickert by way of his ideal-types. For the ideal-types are judgment free, according to Drysdale. Weber used them as points of comparison only: an ideal-type ‘enables the process of investigation and exposition; it implies no stance toward the conceptual object which would inappropriately constrict the range of alternative hypotheses’ (Drysdale 1996, 85). The ideal-types are heuristic in this sense, for they provide us a starting point of reference. The ideal-types are almost arbitrary, then; they have been chosen only because they make sense to us. Other means of making sense may well be chosen by other people.

Truth, by way of comparison, is, according to Drysdale, revealed, and only revealed, as an hypothesis, which ‘unlike the concept (e.g., capitalism) . . . serves to make a claim (empirical, historical) about reality which is subject to validation’ (Drysdale 1996, 80). Any concept, as Drysdale argues, is merely a starting point, unable to reveal the truth unless tied together with other concepts to form a testable hypothesis against history.

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