Ethnicity, Integration and the Military by Henry Dietz

Author:Henry Dietz [Dietz, Henry]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Political Science, General
ISBN: 9780429710407
Google: LHg-EAAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 58839692
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2021-11-28T00:00:00+00:00

Non-Ethnic Integration

As small as the military's role in ethnic social integration may be, there remains a meaningful possibility of army contributions to non-ethnic integration across region, development differential, and social class. Even beyond that remains a possibility that post-1980 military reforms might greatly alter the PLA's contribution (I call this the New Vanguard hypothesis).

The PLA Role

Region. Historically Chinese society was remarkablely decentralized, and locally-oriented; for most people capital and emperor, tucked away in China proper's northeast corner, were distant physically and culturally. Indeed, a leading explanation for the survival for two millennia of one Chinese state territory is the flexibility of a traditional state unified by such strands as a single hierarchy of administrative authority, a single orthodox ideology, and tax deliveries to the center. All else fell in the realm of local affairs. This impressive, durable political culture did not disappear in 1949. Leading characterizations of China's economy and society under the Communists notably emphasize its "cellular structure" or "nested local hierarchies," both implying a significant degree of local autonomy.

I have yet to encounter data on the proportion of PLA recruits who serve in their home province. But at elite levels personal networks of patronage and obligation if not outright military "factions" formed around the regional commands, parallelling tendencies in civilian administration. No less than five early-1980s military reforms were targeted at personalistic, regional power bases: (1) up-or-out promotions, by age 30 in the case of company commanders; (2) rotation of military region commanders; (3) mid-career reassignment of field-grade officers, nearly all of whom now must attend advanced or specialized officer schools, to erode vertical cliques; (4) having unit members evaluate candidates for promotion, hoping that "democratization" would undermine familiar sponsor-protégé promotions; and (5) annual written exams as part of the promotion process (Nelson, 1981: 228-29). As this reform thrust testifies, the army is no less afflicted than the rest of Chinese society with regionalism.

Development Differential. China's economic modernization in the 20th century was led by, if substantially restricted to, coastal and riparian cities having direct diplomatic and trading ties to Japan and the West. Little "true modernization" took place in Republican China (1912-49); no inter-regional freight system - by river steamer, railway, or all-weather highway developed: "more goods were carried in more carts to more shops in more markets more frequently convened - but there was no systemic change" (Skinner, 1964). The wide gap between more developed coast and more primitive interior the Communists inherited became the subject of explicit "locational policy," first favoring the interior, from 1956 building on coastal strength, then gradually favoring the interior again.

Drawing personnel from less modern sectors, the PLA has failed to bridge the gap. Reform-minded efforts to upgrade PLA personnel and especially officers through selective recruitment, promotion, and improved training all bear witness to "shockingly low" education and skill levels (Nelson, 1981:230). Ground forces dominate the PLA, infantry dominate ground forces, and peasants dominate the infantry. Only in 1983 did the Director of the PLA General Political Department (Yu Qiuli) publicly

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