Epistemology in Classical India by Phillips Stephen H

Author:Phillips, Stephen H.
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 978-0-203-15238-6
Publisher: Taylor & Francis (CAM)

Appendix

The Analogy Chapter of Gageśa's “(Wish-Fulfilling) Jewel of Reflection on the Truth (about Epistemology)”

Tattva-cintā-mai

INTRODUCTION

Gangeśa (Nyāya, fourteenth century, Mithila) uses a dialogic structure for the Tattva-cintā-mani (TCM), his masterpiece of epistemology, although except rarely he does not provide his interlocutors' names. He does so in only two places in this short chapter, on analogy (upamāna), which is the third of four chapters, each devoted to examination of a “knowledge source,” pramāna: perception, inference, analogy, and testimony in that order. Gangeśa's dialogic style has been addressed by me in several places, but it is worth again saying a few words—especially about the nature of philosophic pūrva-paka, the prior or prima facie position or an objection, in relation to an author's own views, the siddhānta, the final, established position which answers the pūrva-paka. Readers have to be acutely mindful of this textual division including pūrva-paka within pūrva-paka and sometimes another level down. Without appreciating the dialogical structure of Gangeśa's text, no one could understand more than a few isolated sentences.

A pūrva-paka is topically unified exposition, complete with supporting arguments, of an opposed position or of an attack relative to a siddhānta, which is itself unified exposition of an accepted position, complete with supporting arguments and/or correlate responses. Gangeśa probably expected his immediate audience to be able to identify proponents and practically hear the voices of individual advocates. I use emboldened labelling to bring out the players in the dialogue, sometimes no more specific than a nondescript “Opponent” versus “Gageśa” expressing his own view, or an objector to a first or principal objector, labelled then “Opponent.2” versus “Opponent.1.” With the emboldening of Gangeśa's own name, however, probably I am a little over-bold, slightly distorting the text. Let me explain.

Throughout the TCM, Gageśa uses expressions such as mama tu, “My view, in contrast,” as discourse markers, a practice that may be generalized, attributing siddhānta sections to Gageśa himself. But such ascription does not suggest as much as it should. A siddhānta is normally more than Gageśa's own view; it is supposed to be the view of Nyāya tradition, a view that Gageśa is interpreting as well as asserting anew (atra brūmaḥ also occurs as a discourse marker: “To this, we respond”). Furthermore, a siddhānta indicator is not meant to introduce a perspective or way things might be, but a view arrived at by careful considerations and asserted as true. It is reflective knowledge, niraya. The propositions that comprise a siddhānta are asserted both as true and as definitive of Nyāya even when they are original. The emboldened labelling of Gageśa's name is, then, best understood as signaling text where Gageśa gives his own views while taking himself to speak for the school. To be sure, rival Naiyāyika positions are sometimes aired, and often he distinguishes his contemporary or “New” (navya) Nyāya from that of “Old” Nyāya, as he does in one place in this chapter, even mentioning one philosopher of Old Nyāya by name (Jayanta Bhaa). Nevertheless, siddhāntas are asserted as expressing the positions of a school, not only of an individual philosopher.

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