Envy in Politics by McClendon Gwyneth H.;

Author:McClendon, Gwyneth H.;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Published: 2018-03-06T16:00:00+00:00

Participate

a, a

c, b

Don’t participate

b, c

d, d

The latter insight offers new suggestions for why participation in collective action is much more common than the literature on the dilemmas of collective action197 predict.198 Consider, for example, Chong’s discussion of social incentives in the context of collective action.199 Chong argues that there are selective social rewards for participation in collective action but that they are all contingent upon the participation of others. That is, he argues that the expressive benefits (joy, catharsis) and social benefits (a sense of belonging and collective purpose) of participating are realized only if others participate as well. He thus describes the collective action problem as an assurance game, in which individuals want to participate only if they believe that others will participate as well. Participating is the payoff-dominant strategy, whereas not participating is the risk-dominant strategy. An implication of this characterization is that we should see collective action increase when the costs of coordination are lowered and where individuals believe that others will also participate. The set-up of this assurance game is in table 2.15, where a > b = d and b > c.

However, the importance of status motivations changes the game. Status motivations are about achieving distinction from others. In other words, unlike the social selective incentives Chong focuses on, status rewards are earned only if most other people do not show up. If individuals care only about status, then the promise of status motivations transforms the decision about whether to participate into a prisoner’s dilemma game: the individual gains status only if the other does not participate. Under this scenario, we might actually expect to observe collective action when there is an expectation that few people will show up. Furthermore, if we allow that individuals care about status and about other social benefits from participating alongside others, then the promise of status motivations from participation may mean the drop in payoffs between the top left and top right quadrants in table 2.15 is not steep. In fact, there might not be any drop-off. This would mean that while individuals anticipate some social and psychological benefits from participating when everyone else does, they also understand that in the event that others do not show up in large numbers, they will get a status benefit instead. Thus collective action may arise even when there is a low probability that many others will show up.200

Whether or not these macro implications hold up in future research, an important takeaway from this discussion is that it is helpful to think about status motivations as one set of considerations among many. Rather than muddying the waters, an approach that encompasses the complexity of the human mind can actually help us make sense of puzzling patterns. For instance, acknowledging that people care both about reaping social rewards that come from being part of a crowd and about individual distinction makes it less surprising that collective action occurs as often as it does. I further discuss interactions across motivations in the conclusion.

Finally, before

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