Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism by Pape Robert

Author:Pape, Robert [Pape, Robert]
Language: eng
Format: epub, mobi
Publisher: Random House, Inc.
Published: 2005-05-24T07:00:00+00:00

THE SIKHS AFTER THE GOLDEN TEMPLE MASSACRE

On August 31, 1995, a suicide bomber leapt at Beant Singh, the chief minister of the state of Punjab in India, as he was leaving his car outside of the secretariat building in the capital city of Chandigarh. The attack killed Minister Singh, fifteen of his security guards and aides, and the bomber himself, identified as Dilawar Singh, a young man in his early twenties who had left a note to his accomplices saying that his act was “in memory of the martyrs.” This was the first successful suicide attack associated with the Sikh terrorist group called the Babbar Khalsa International, which publicly claimed the attack as a step toward the goal of Sikh independence in Punjab. The episode presaged a number of attempted suicide attacks that continued through January 2000.70

This is a borderline case of a campaign of suicide terrorism. Although there was only one successful attack, the fact that the same Sikh terrorist group carried out at least one other possible (ambiguous) suicide attack and organized other follow-on suicide attacks that were foiled only as a result of early detection by local police indicates that the lone successful attack was part of a protracted effort. Moreover, if we look beyond our narrow definition of a suicide attack—the attacker kills himself in order to kill others—there are other instances of suicidal violence by Sikh militants precipitated by the virulent nationalism of the 1980s and 1990s. The key question is whether the relatively low level of suicide terrorism by Sikh militants is due to substantially the same causes as more ambitious suicide terrorist campaigns.

The answer is yes. Examination of this case shows that the rise of suicide terrorism among Sikh militants is part of a national liberation movement that failed to achieve its aims through ordinary means of armed resistance. During the 1980s, the Sikh community experienced increasing control by the Indian government, including the prominent presence of the Indian army in Punjab. Militants portrayed the situation as a military occupation that would lead to the transformation of the Sikh national identity by an alien power, and this produced widespread community support for armed resistance and self-sacrifice to return to the status quo ante. Precisely when ordinary armed resistance seemed to have failed, Sikh militants turned to suicide terrorism as a last resort. They appear to have abandoned that effort when it, too, failed to yield significant results for their cause.

Indian Military Presence in Sikh Homeland

The Sikh homeland is in the Punjab province of India, whose population in 1991 was approximately 20 million, 61 percent Sikh and 37 percent Hindu.71 Punjab ranks among the top three of India’s twenty-five states in per capita income and is the lowest in percentage of population below the poverty line. The Sikh religion was born in Punjab when its founder, Guru Nanak (1469–1539), abandoned Hinduism’s polytheism, idol worship, and caste system in favor of a simple and strict monotheism that propounded the oneness of God, rejected the worship of idols, and emphasized the equality of all people.

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