Destroying Yemen by Blumi

Author:Blumi [Blumi]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780520296145
Amazon: 0520296141
Publisher: University of California Press
Published: 2018-01-09T00:00:00+00:00

UNION NEVER TO BE

The unification process evolved quickly in the 1989–1990 period.21 Declared on May 22, 1990, the first phase included adopting some common policies in customs and taxation but leaving the crucial process of integrating the army commands, for example, totally up in the air (Detalle 1998: 272). More importantly perhaps for the long-term political development of a unified Yemen was the fact that trade unions serving as the power base for the YSP and “tribal” militias loyal to Saleh and al-Ahmar remained basically separate. Worse, with only a modicum of integration at the top allowed, two different “national” polities remained intact with two completely different sets of patronage networks in operation. Such a divide would not be crossed prior to elections in 1993.

A series of strategic steps taken by various interests, each with their own internal logic, marked the crucial interim period before the 1993 elections. From the perspective of GPC’s leadership, the process ensured its domination over rewriting laws, critical to protecting the interests of their larger constituent base. Such advantages may in fact explain why Saleh conceded to lesser southern demands that, for example, Yemen allow for a free press (meaning some southern-controlled papers would circulate in the north). Saleh also agreed to permit “multiple parties” to participate throughout the unified country leading up to the first elections (Schwedler 2006: 59–61; Burrowes 1998). Such concessions enabled the GPC to secure potential rivals’ confidence in the early phase of unification, thus enabling the passing of new laws designed to assist the plunder of, in particular, South Yemen’s state-owned properties.

At the crucial moment of unification in 1990, the biggest source of dissention in the country was the worsening economic crisis caused by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. As punishment for Yemen’s less-than-emphatic condemnation of Saddam Hussain’s actions (recall Yemen was in an economic alliance with Iraq by way of the Arab Cooperation Council [ACC], and Saleh personally decried the conservative monarchies as a menace to progressive Arab republics) the GCC not only cut off more than $500 million in aid to the country but proceeded to expel upwards of 800,000 Yemeni workers from their countries (Colton 1991).

The return of so many people, plus the loss of more than $2 billion in remittances, transformed the political horizons for all parties (Stevenson 1993). While clearly negative, some identified opportunities from this humanitarian disaster. The single biggest contingency created by this crisis was the greater pressure put on land, especially in and around Sana‘a’, Hudaydah, and Aden. Largely unable to return to their villages due to a lack of local resources, a by-product of those policies introduced to escalate crop substitution in Yemen’s farms as demanded by the IMF and USAID, it became increasingly impossible to peacefully settle hundreds of thousands of evicted workers in their regions of origin. Instead, state agencies monopolized by the GPC saw this pool of internally displaced people (IDPs) an invaluable political asset into which, over time, numerous domestic and foreign actors invested.

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