Dereliction of Duty by H. R. McMaster

Author:H. R. McMaster [McMaster, H. R.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 978-0-06-203118-1
Publisher: HarperCollins
Published: 1997-03-27T16:00:00+00:00

General Westmoreland did not share Taylor’s reluctance to introduce American ground combat units. Like Harold Johnson, Westmoreland believed that ground forces should deploy to South Vietnam before the initiation of Rolling Thunder. On February 9, in the wake of the Pleiku attack, Westmoreland sent a cable to Wheeler alerting the chairman that the situation in South Vietnam might require U.S. combat forces “in division strength” to protect U.S. personnel and installations. In reply Wheeler asked him for the numbers and types of units he needed. On February 17 Westmoreland prioritized three places that required Americans for security: Danang, the greater Saigon area, and Nha Trang. Admiral Sharp agreed with Westmoreland’s assessment and recommended the deployment of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) to Danang. The Chiefs had recommended deploying an MEB in their “compromise” memorandum of February 11 and, on February 18, the JCS once again forwarded the recommendation to McNamara. It would be up to Westmoreland to persuade Taylor to go along with the deployment.50

Taylor resisted. On February 22 the ambassador objected strenuously to any deployment of American combat troops to South Vietnam. Taylor argued that “white-faced” American soldiers were “not suitable guerrilla fighters for Asian forests and jungles” and warned that U.S. troops would do no better than had the French ten years earlier. He predicted that the introduction of U.S. ground combat forces would sap ARVN’s determination to fight and lead to tensions between American soldiers and Vietnamese civilians. Taylor considered the JCS plan to introduce an entire MEB a “grandiose scheme” that far exceeded any military requirement for security.51

Despite these objections, Westmoreland got Taylor to compromise. Taylor hoped that the deployment of a small force would quell calls for the Marine brigade and other units. Instead of an entire brigade, Westmoreland and Taylor asked for one-third of that force, a Marine Battalion Landing Team (BLT) of 1,200 men, to deploy to Danang. Taylor suggested that a small force would “be more manageable… from the point of view of accommodating it on base and absorbing it into the Danang community.” He recognized, however, that once American ground forces arrived in any number, “it will be very difficult to hold the line” on further deployments. He conceded the need for one battalion, but urged that the United States “adhere to our past policy of keeping our ground forces out of [a] direct counterinsurgency role.”52

On February 26, during a meeting with Rusk, McNamara, Ball, and McGeorge Bundy, LBJ approved deploying a helicopter squadron and two Marine battalions to Danang, a force more than twice as large as Taylor thought necessary. The decision was casual and made without consideration of the radically changed nature of the American commitment once U.S. ground combat units entered South Vietnam.53 It seemed an easy decision to the president because it represented a consensus among his civilian advisers and the action could be justified under the compelling argument that U.S. installations and people had to be protected. His civilian advisers viewed the deployments as a reversible show of force or a benign defensive action.

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