Defending the Holy Land by Maoz Zeev;

Author:Maoz, Zeev;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: University of Michigan Press

6. THE LEBANESE QUAGMIRE

As noted in chapter 6, Israeli politicians harbored pipe dreams of helping establish a Christian-dominated state in Lebanon that would break the circle of hostility of the Arab world vis-à-vis Israel.15 During a meeting in Ben-Gurion's office on May 16, 1955, Moshe Dayan stated,

all it takes is to find an officer [in the Lebanese army], even a captain, to win his heart or buy his loyalty with money, so he should declare himself as the savior of the Maronite community. Then the IDF would enter Lebanon, will occupy the territory that is required, and will establish a Christian government in alliance with Israel. The area south of the Litany River will be completely annexed to Israel, and all will be well.

Sharett himself rejected this as a “crazy idea,” but not because it was utterly immoral. Rather, he saw this as a completely impractical adventure. The Christians could not be relied upon to deliver their part of the bargain (Sharett 1978, 996–97).

While these ideas continued to circulate in various political circles, they had never been converted into anything remotely resembling a practical plan. Secret meetings between Israeli officials and Christian Lebanese leaders took place throughout the period of 1948–74, but no operational discussions materialized in these talks (Yaniv 1987a, 28–37; Erlich 2000). These dreams of establishing a Maronite state in Lebanon and of annexing the area south of the Litany River remained what they were—wish dreams of politicians and some military leaders in Israel. When it came to discussing these ideas in more operational terms, it became evident that the political repercussions of such a scheme were enormous. Not the least of these was the belief of many Israeli leaders that the credibility of the Christian leadership in Lebanon was questionable and that it was unlikely that the Maronites would be willing to completely disassociate themselves from the Arab world. This impression started changing in the mid-1970s.

Up until the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1974, Israeli clandestine activity in Lebanon was limited to typical intelligence gathering through both electronic and human means. There were occasional secret talks between Israeli agents and Lebanese leaders, but there was no Israeli involvement in Lebanese politics. As noted in chapter 6, Lebanon was still seen as posing a relatively low threat to Israel's security.

The Syrian intervention in Lebanon was seen—despite some risks—as having net benefits for Israel. For the most part, the Syrian presence in the country helped reduce the extent of PLO activity in Lebanon. Syrian forces in Lebanon were also seen as weakening the overall capacity of Syria to wage war against Israel (Evron 1987, 160–75).

At the outbreak of the civil war, Israeli intelligence developed strong ties with the Christian militias. These ties involved typical interventionist tactics: supply of weapons, tactical advice, intelligence sharing, and so forth. In southern Lebanon a Christian paramilitary force headed by Major Sa'ad Haddad developed strong ties with the Israelis, on both official and unofficial levels (Yaniv 1987b, 61, 65). Yet, during the

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