Deceit on the Road to War: Presidents, Politics, and American Democracy by John M. Schuessler

Author:John M. Schuessler [Schuessler, John M.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Leadership, Iraq War (2003-2011), History & Theory, American Government, United States, Campaigns & Elections, Military, 20th Century, Vietnam War, Political Science, Political Process, Executive Branch, History, World War II, Security (National & International)
ISBN: 9781501701627
Google: OzBKDwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 26133255
Publisher: Cornell University Press
Published: 2015-01-01T00:00:00+00:00

Subdued Debate in Congress

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the prewar debate was the subdued role played by Congress. Jane Cramer presents compelling evidence that a large majority in Congress, including a fair number of Republicans, was not persuaded that attacking Iraq was necessary. 35 Notably, Senators Joseph Biden (D-Delaware), Richard Lugar (R-Indiana), and Chuck Hagel (R-Nebraska), all on the Foreign Relations Committee, spear-headed a bipartisan effort that nearly succeeded in drastically circumscribing Bush’s authority. The Biden-Lugar-Hagel Resolution, which reportedly had the backing of at least sixty to seventy senators, including as many as twenty-five Republicans, was crafted to allow Bush to attack Iraq only for the purpose of destroying Iraqi WMDs and only after seeking authorization from the UN Security Council. In the event that UN approval was not forthcoming, the resolution required the president to return to Congress and demonstrate that the threat to the United States posed by Iraqi WMDs was so grave as to necessitate military action. As it happens, the Biden-Lugar-Hagel initiative fell apart when Richard Gephardt (D-Missouri), the House minority leader, agreed to grant broad war powers to Bush, even appearing with him in the Rose Garden on October 2, 2002, to announce that the text of the draft Iraq War Resolution had been finalized. The speculation among Democrats was that Gephardt, who was determined to run for president in 2004, did not want to repeat the mistake he had made in 1991 by voting against the first Persian Gulf War, thereby creating an opening for Republicans to paint him as soft and hesitant to use force. 36

Gephardt’s defection precluded any possibility of a bipartisan alternative to the Iraq War Resolution because no Republican could afford to be seen as weaker on national security than the top Democratic leader in the House. Lacking bipartisan cover, Democrats who had been on the fence, especially those who were facing tough reelection fights and those who harbored presidential aspirations, shied away from directly challenging the administration. The way was now clear for Bush to secure a blank check from Congress. With the result foreordained, the debate in Congress over whether to go to war was anticlimactic. At their most intense points, the debates in the House and Senate attracted fewer than 10 percent of the members of each body. 37 Overall, the Senate devoted six days of debate to Iraq, which paled in comparison to the twenty-one days spent debating the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, the twenty-three days spent on the energy bill, the nineteen days spent on the trade bill, and the eighteen days spent on the farm bill. 38 This was despite the fact that the NIE on Iraqi WMDs had been delivered only on October 1, 2002, three days before debate began. Senate staff later calculated that no more than six members went to the secure room where the highly classified document was kept to read it for themselves. 39

Bowing to the inevitable, leading Democrats in Congress authorized the president to use force even as they registered their doubts in floor speeches.

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