Collision of Empires by Strang G. Bruce;

Author:Strang, G. Bruce;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2016-03-14T16:00:00+00:00

Chapter 9

Schreck and Schadenfreude: Hitler, German Alliance Priorities and the Abyssinian Crisis, 1935–1936

Geoffrey T. Waddington

The Abyssinian crisis of 1935–36 is widely perceived as a seminal development in the international history of the 1930s and a significant marker on the road to the outbreak of war in 1939. 1 Quite apart from its impact on the local balance of power, with all its implications for Britain’s deepening strategic dilemma, Mussolini’s African enterprise had profound repercussions on relations between the major powers which manifestly facilitated Hitler’s later outrages. The catalogue of benefits derived by Germany from the crisis is indeed formidable: it was the decisive factor in the collapse of the Stresa front; it administered the fatal blow to collective security and destroyed what remained of the League’s credibility; it imposed strains on Anglo-French relations additional to those already generated by the Franco-Soviet Pact and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement; it enabled Hitler to reoccupy the Rhineland at least one year ahead of schedule; it indirectly compromised the integrity and independence of Austria; and it was, at least according to the Nazi and Fascist propagandists, a critical moment in the formation of the Rome-Berlin Axis. These major considerations aside, the Abyssinian imbroglio also served the Third Reich in less obvious ways: it furnished Hitler with a convenient excuse for declining negotiations on troublesome issues such as arms limitation and multilateral security arrangements; it stimulated the recently initiated campaign for the return of the former German colonies; it opened up lucrative opportunities for the development and expansion of German trade, notably in south-east Europe; and it served as a welcome and timely distraction, diverting world attention from its apparent preoccupation with German rearmament. Gerhard Weinberg would thus appear to have ample justification for his contention that as a result of the Abyssinian crisis ‘the whole world situation had changed greatly, to Germany’s advantage’. 2

The consolidation of Germany’s international position which was effected during the Abyssinian crisis is all the more striking in view of the precarious situation which had confronted the Reich in the spring of 1935. At that time Hitler had been faced with a range of awkward proposals which were palpably designed to restrict his freedom of action, a seemingly burgeoning Franco-Italian rapprochement, the emergence of Soviet Russia as a major factor in continental affairs, uncertainty over the future direction of Polish policy following the death of Pilsudski and, most alarmingly, the Anglo-French-Italian front formed at Stresa where the three powers had not only engaged in a collective denunciation of unilateral German rearmament but also reaffirmed their interest in the maintenance of Austrian independence and the Treaty of Locarno. These were worrying times for the Nazi leadership. On 2 April, with the Stresa conference looming, the Reich Propaganda Minister found Hitler beset by anxieties, ‘very serious and reflective’, tormented by issues of foreign policy. 3 Sensing an impending crisis, Goebbels himself confessed to harbouring ‘great anxieties for the fate of the country’. 4 Small wonder, therefore, that twelve months later he should

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