Collective Resistance in China: Why Popular Protests Succeed or Fail by Yongshun Cai

Author:Yongshun Cai [Cai, Yongshun]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Social Science, Political Science, Anthropology, Political Process, World, Cultural & Social, General
ISBN: 9780804763394
Google: e97ErKeqb08C
Goodreads: 10645799
Publisher: Stanford University Press
Published: 2010-02-17T00:00:00+00:00

Conclusion

This chapter discusses an important method used by Chinese citizens—disruptive tactics—to move their issues onto the agendas of state authorities. As elsewhere, disruptive actions are “ ‘outside of normal politics’ and ‘against normal politics’ in the sense that people break the rules defining permissible modes of political action.”52 Disruptive tactics have been used by protesters in both democracies and nondemocracies, and a common factor that affects protesters’ chances for success is the size of the protest: “There always seems to be power in numbers.”53 In democracies, a large-scale action may signal the preference of a large number of people, which then places pressure on politicians.54 Authoritarian governments are even more sensitive to unauthorized large-scale action because such actions not only threaten social or political stability but also signal the weakness of the state and may escalate into crises if mishandled.

In China, disruptive tactics are generally illegal, but they have helped citizens achieve success. Large-scale disruptive actions are effective because they pose a direct threat to local officials’ images. As mentioned earlier, lower-level local governments are required to report large-scale protests to upper-level governments, including the central government, within a regulated period of time. Given that local officials are not allowed to cover up such incidents,55 the threat of intervention from above becomes a serious constraint for local officials. Central or provincial authorities do intervene when the pressure for maintaining social stability or regime legitimacy mounts. In these circumstances, local governments feel the necessity of concessions. This is why Chinese citizens believe in the rationale of “no appeals without enough participants” (ren shao bu shangfang) or “no action without enough power” (li bo bu dengchang).56 Understandably, when a case involves serious casualties and/or receives media coverage, local governments that are responsible for dealing with such incidents face even more pressure. Concessions tend to be the only option if protesters’ demands are legitimate. However, the forcefulness of resistance is weighed against the cost of concessions. A number of cases of forceful resistance have been ignored or even suppressed by local governments. Cases that involve higher-level local governments may deter intervention from the central or provincial authorities.

The cases presented in this chapter suggest that disruptive resistance involving only a small number of participants tends to be suppressed by local governments when the cost of concessions is high. To be sure, such cases may create a false impression of the extent of repression by the Chinese government, leaving out as they do the many cases in which citizens’ resistance is ignored and therefore tolerated. For example, local governments rarely use force to deal with elderly protesters, such as retired workers. One method used by local governments in dealing with retirees’ protests is to ferry these elder protesters to suburbs and leave them there.57 The cases I collected do point to a common rationale behind local governments’ response: The suppression of weak groups is more likely because it is more feasible and less costly. As Tilly suggests, “The more powerful the group, on average, the less repression it receives.

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