Christian Moral Theology in the Emerging Technoculture by Waters Brent;Peters Professor Ted;Trigg Professor Roger;Van Huyssteen Professor J. Wentzel;

Author:Waters, Brent;Peters, Professor Ted;Trigg, Professor Roger;Van Huyssteen, Professor J. Wentzel;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Taylor & Francis Group
Published: 2014-08-15T00:00:00+00:00

Chapter 6

Repentance: The Renewing Possibilities of Second Births

I argued in the previous chapter that judgment creates a new space in and through which the trajectory of moral action is reoriented. More importantly, judgment may lead to confession, prompting a more radical reorientation. This metanoia results from a sense of contrition: the recognition that wrongs must be righted. Confession, then, leads to repentance: the simultaneous acknowledgment that a past course and current trajectory of action must be broken, and subsequent acts redirected. Repentance, however, is predicated on hope, for if there is no belief that the past can be broken and the future reoriented for the better, then there is no need to repent. Moreover, if such hope is to be effectual, then it must instigate the real prospect of forgiving and promising. In order to right a wrong, the aggrieved and offending parties must be reconciled, and such reconciliation must also be accompanied by the promise of amended future conduct.

To a large extent, Hannah Arendt’s account of forgiving and promising provides a moral and political space in which repentance and amendment of life can be operative.1 Although she admits that attempting to right a wrong cannot undo past events or action, forgiveness can nonetheless break their spiraling aftermath of vengeance when accompanied by promises of altered behavior in the future. In the absence of forgiveness civil community remains mired in the past, and in the absence of promise it has no incentive to move on. The net result is a paralysis of new and renewing action, stemming from a fear, if not despair, that the past sequence of vengeance cannot be broken and promises cannot be made or kept. Together, forgiving and promising orients moral and political action toward the prospect of natality, thereby exchanging the certainty of repetitive vengeance for the uncertain hope of new and unexpected possibilities.

Although Arendt offers a rich conceptual scheme that may be used profitably in engaging with the emerging technoculture, it is nonetheless inadequate, as I argued in Chapter 3. Arendt’s difficulty stems from her attempt to remove Jesus’ teaching on forgiveness from its theological framework. She contends that reason can be substituted for a shared religious faith. People can forgive, be forgiven, and keep promises as good Kantians rather than as faithful Christians. This is, however, a curious argument, for, as Arendt admits, if forgiving and promising are to be efficacious, these closely related acts must be grounded in a recognized and binding authority. As Arendt also admits, it is precisely such authority that has vanished from the late modern world, because it is predicated on common religious beliefs and practices. Yet she refuses to abandon hope, insisting that although universal reason may not have the same binding force as a common religion, it is nonetheless a sufficient substitute. But one is hard-pressed to find in her corpus a convincing argument, either conceptually or practically, that her scheme could work. In fairness to Arendt, this was a project she had initiated but was

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