Beyond Crisis by Panagiotis Doulos; John Holloway; Katerina Nasioka

Author:Panagiotis Doulos; John Holloway; Katerina Nasioka
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: PM Press
Published: 2020-03-12T16:00:00+00:00

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In the discourse of the Left, the state conserved its autonomy with regard to capital and the markets. Thus, neoliberalism appeared as the bad expression of capitalism, an expression that had to change so that there could be capitalism with a more human face. Importantly, there was also faith that representative democracy could beat the markets and austerity. Through this bizarre matrimony of Poulantzas and Keynes, Syriza declared the memorandum went against the country and its democratic institutions, while at the same time insisting it sought a solution within the Eurozone. Syriza believed democracy could change the neoliberal structure of the EU, at the heart of which Germany constituted a dominant voice and appeared as the source of all evil. Syriza’s campaign promises had been to free the country from the memorandums, begin “real negotiations” on the debt, and implement policies that would allow for a fair development. In this sense, bourgeois democracy acquired the mystified form of the “voice of the people” that goes beyond the oligarchy of the markets. That is, “real democracy”—as the expression of the will of the people—and Reason were able to overcome the power of the markets, expressed in the institutions of the Troika and the memorandums.

In January 2015, Syriza won the elections with the catchphrase “hope is on the way” and formed a coalition government with right-wing party Independent Greeks (ANEL). But this hope never escaped the administrative logic of realpolitik. It is no coincidence that Syriza representatives stated that the proposals of the Greek government were realistic and reasonable and, for that reason, the government could attain a good agreement and commitment with the “Institutions,” the name that simply replaced the “Troika.” The agreement reached between the government and the Institutions in February 2015 was the first act to mark the distance between Syriza’s campaign promises and its decisions, which did not break with the logic of austerity. At that moment, the government insisted the agreement was temporary—unlike the memorandums—and useful for attaining a final agreement that would put the country back on the track of development and provide a solution to the debt crisis.

The negotiations for a final agreement continued until June 28, 2015, the moment at which Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras called for a referendum on July 5 on the demands made by the Institutions, that is, the proposal made by Jean-Claude Juncker (2015). During the week preceding the referendum, the Greek state was on the verge of defaulting on its payments and was under a regime of capital controls: economic transactions were restricted, the banks were closed, and constraints were imposed on cash withdrawals. The discussions taking place in the streets of Greek cities had a taste of “strange happiness” but were also permeated by fear and anguish regarding the future. Long queues in front of ATMs,10 the city frozen in a state of shock, intense debate: these are all parts of the pendulum that oscillated from hope to despair and back, and built up through the expectation of the great event of the referendum.

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