Americans, Congress, and Democratic Responsiveness by Jones David R.;McDermott Monika L.;

Author:Jones, David R.;McDermott, Monika L.;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: University of Michigan Press

CHAPTER 6

Riding the Electoral Wave

The composition of Congress is determined not only by the decisions of voters but also by potential candidates‚ decisions on whether or not to run for office. Smart politicians will be strategic when making this decision. According to Jacobson and Kernell (1983), being strategic in this context involves taking into account how national political conditions prior to an election might affect one’s prospects for success in that election. A strategic politician will be more likely to run when conditions are favorable and may choose to sit out when prospects for victory are grim. In chapter 5, we demonstrated that congressional approval ratings affect voting across all types of congressional elections and thereby affect the electoral fortunes of candidates who run in these elections. That congressional performance has an impact on electoral outcomes begs the question of whether savvy politicians, deciding whether or not to run for office, have some awareness of this relationship–if not consciously, then at least instinctually–and factor it into their decision-making calculus.

In this chapter, we analyze the possible connection between public evaluations of Congress and the strategic behavior of candidates. In particular, we are interested in two types of strategic behavior: that of incumbents and that of high-quality challengers to incumbents.1 In each electoral cycle, congressional incumbents must decide whether to run for reelection–a safe bet much more often than not–or to retire. In addition, quality potential challengers must decide whether or not to take on an incumbent—a risky attempt under the best of circumstances. Existing research in each area suggests that such decisions are not random but are instead based on rational calculations made by the political actors involved. Incumbents occasionally retire rather than face potential defeat (e.g., Hall and Van Houweling 1995), and high-quality challengers sometimes take a chance and run against a current incumbent if they think they can win (e.g., Black 1972). Our purpose in this chapter is to determine what role, if any, public approval of Congress plays in influencing whether or not incumbents run and whether or not they face a quality challenger.

There is a distinct set of literature regarding the strategic behavior of quality challengers, there is another regarding strategic retirements by incumbents, and the factors known to affect each are not exactly the same. 2 Given this fact, it is entirely conceivable that congressional approval may not have the same effect in each situation. For this reason, we have chosen to treat each question separately—addressing strategic, high-quality challenges first and then strategic incumbent retirements. At the end of the chapter, we compare these findings and discuss what they say about the overall role congressional evaluations play in politicians’ decisions of whether or not to run for Congress at any given time.

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