Vortex of Conflict by Caldwell Dan

Author:Caldwell, Dan
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Stanford University Press
Published: 2011-03-01T16:00:00+00:00

Source: Compiled by the author from various sources.

The mission of the PRTs was threefold: to enhance security, to strengthen the reach of the central Afghan government, and to facilitate reconstruction.85 At times, these goals conflicted with military missions. For example, the PRTs would attempt to improve relationships with local leaders only to have U.S. military units raid and/or arrest the very leaders with whom they were trying to develop improved relationships. Despite problems, when he took over in Afghanistan in November 2003, Lieutenant General David Barno almost doubled the number of PRTs from eight to fourteen in less than a year. By 2005, there were twenty-two PRTs in Afghanistan, and they were viewed as “One of the few efforts in Afghanistan to approach military S&R [stabilization and reconstruction] tasks in a coordinated fashion at the tactical level.”86 By 2010 there were 27 PRTs in Afghanistan, and the number of civilians relative to military staff had increased significantly.

On November 11, 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced the founding of the first Provincial Reconstruction Team for Iraq, and Table 10.1 summarizes the number of PRTs in both Afghanistan and Iraq. But the Iraqi PRTs differed significantly from those in Afghanistan. In Iraq, a State Department official, not a military officer, was in charge, and the PRTs were staffed mostly by civilians. By the end of 2006, there were ten PRTs in Iraq, followed by twenty-five in 2007, and thirty-one in 2008. According to President Bush, the teams helped “local Iraqi communities pursue reconciliation, strengthen the moderates, and speed the transition to self-reliance.”87 Some of those in Iraq, however, disagreed that these objectives were being achieved. Colonel Peter Mansoor, the commander of the 1st Combat Brigade, 1st Armored Division, in Baghdad from 2003 to 2004 and later the executive officer to General David Petraeus, noted, “Only in 2007 were provincial reconstruction teams embedded with combat teams across Iraq, thereby providing a powerful tool to assist brigade commanders in accomplishing their mission. Regrettably, the change came four years too late.”88 There were two main stumbling blocks in deploying the teams in a timely fashion: the State Department wanted assurance that security would be provided for their personnel, and Rumsfeld was unenthusiastic about committing military forces to provide security. According to a State Department official interviewed by Tom Ricks, “The president would say, ‘Get this done,’ and leave the room. . . . And then Rumsfeld would start squabbling with Condi—‘We’re not gonna secure your PRTs!’”89 The debate concerning these issues caused a delay in fully deploying the teams and embedding them with combat units.90

There were other problems as well.91 One was the ongoing staffing problem. As of July 2008, State had 230 personnel deployed to PRTs in Iraq, USAID had ninety-five, and DOD had only ninety personnel in PRTs in Iraq. In some cases, military personnel were assigned to PRTs outside of their training and specializations. For example, RAND analyst Seth Jones describes meeting and interviewing a PRT leader, Commander Larry Legere, in

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