The Persian Gulf and the West (RLE Iran D) by Charles Kupchan

Author:Charles Kupchan [Kupchan, Charles]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Social Science, Regional Studies
ISBN: 9781136834127
Google: sRMiH6XoWWIC
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Published: 2012-04-27T03:39:42+00:00

Chapter Six

U.S. Power in the Gulf

Military Strategy and Regional Politics

The task before the Carter and Reagan administrations was formidable, yet clear. The United States needed explicit military cooperation from countries alienated by America’s position on the Arab-Israeli conflict and disappointed in Washington’s ineffectual response to the chaos in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia and Oman were not averse to improving their military ties with the United States. Yet, the Saudis in particular did not want to be dependent upon America for their own security needs, nor were they willing to allow any extensive cooperation to be publicized for fear of popular opposition and backlash. The Kuwaitis, on the other hand, were opposed to explicit cooperation with Washington. They preferred to purchase arms from both the Soviets and the West and resisted the presence of any foreign power in the Gulf. And therein lay an inherent conflict between the Carter Doctrine and the political realities in the Gulf; for if the RDF were to provide the United States with a credible military capability—one that was sufficiently powerful and visible to deter the Soviets or local aggressors—it required regional access, if not a permanent presence.

Thus, the challenge facing the Carter and Reagan administrations was not how to build the RDF—that had already been decided—but how to construct a political framework within which the Gulf regimes would be receptive to American aims. The key was to provide those incentives, whether it be a quiet handshake or a major military exercise, that would strengthen cooperation on a broad scale between the United States and the Gulf states. There existed a middle ground between establishing a major U.S. base in the Gulf and continuing to tolerate glaring strategic vulnerability in the region. Finding that middle ground would make the difference between forming cooperative alliances and inciting anti-Western sentiment.

There were several principal variables at the core of U.S. policy toward Gulf security after 1979, and these issues form the focus of the ensuing discussion. First, there was great concern over how to publicize the change in policy. Should the RDF be presented as part of a global strategy, a regional strategy, or a reaction to vulnerablity in a specific theater? Second, it was clear from the outset that the undertaking as a whole had the potential to change profoundly relations between Washington and the states of the region. Negotiations on the RDF, regardless of their content, stimulated more contact at all governmental levels. How could the Gulf states be convinced that a U.S. military presence was, in fact, in their interest? Preparations for the force meant a potentially dangerous increase in the number of U.S. personnel in the area. Yet, improvements in host country facilities also augmented the military capabilities of those states. Could the RDF and its related preparations serve as an enzyme for broader political and strategic cooperation between the United States and Gulf states?

The third variable concerns the use of arms sales as a new type of policy instrument.

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