The Old Contemptibles by Robin Neillands

Author:Robin Neillands
Language: eng
Format: azw3, epub
Publisher: Endeavour Press Ltd.
Published: 2013-10-01T04:00:00+00:00

Robertson is describing the situation after the Western Front settled down, but during the retreat from Mons the problem was compounded by the fact that GHQ moved frequently and the various Corps and Division HQs moved daily - if not more often - while the front-line units were widely dispersed and the roads crowded with refugees. Since good communications are vital to command and control, this problem may account for some of Field Marshal French's various errors and confusions, but he made no real effort to find out what was going on - and appeared particularly uninterested in the affairs of II Corps, unless they provided an excuse for criticizing Smith-Dorrien.

Even his own memoirs contribute to an impression that the size and violence of this war exceeded the field marshal's ability to command, and there can be no doubt that far too much attention was devoted to brooding over the presence of his unwanted subordinate. Where Smith-Dorrien is involved, even tactical victories such as Mons should be discounted. According to French's memoirs, the German forces opposing Smith-Dorrien at Mons- two army corps and a cavalry division, six full divisions by the German count - are fictitious; the battle becomes a mere skirmish with German cavalry patrols. Smith-Dorrien is criticized for evacuating the Mons salient, though a glance at any map reveals that this position was untenable once the enemy advanced.

It is also interesting, and somewhat ironic, that the pages of French's regrettable memoir, spattered with complaints about Horace Smith-Dorrien, devote considerable praise to the actions of Douglas Haig and I Corps, a unit that was hardly troubled during the retreat from Mons- certainly not in comparison with the problems encountered by Smith-Dorrien's troops.

The irony is that French's main internal enemy in 1914 was Lieutenant-General Sir Douglas Haig, who was keeping a con­ stant and critical eye on his wayward superior. On hearing of French's appointment to the BEF, Haig's first- and entirely justifiable - reaction was that French was not the man to command Britain's only field army in this kind of war. By September, with a month's experience of French in the field, Haig was openly informing anyone who would listen that French was not up to the job; if unaware of this in 1914, French must have known of Haig's perfidy by 1918 when he started writing his memoirs, but none of this mattered. In his antipathy, if in nothing else, French was consistent; if destroying the reputation of Horace Smith-Dorrien required showering praise on the slippery Douglas Haig, so be it.

On 1 September 1914, Joffre made the decision that was to reverse French fortunes and give the generalissimo his enduring reputation as the saviour of France. Joffre has had numerous critics, but not even the most dedicated will deny that by keeping his nerve in the midst of apparent disaster, by remustering his forces and biding his time, Joffre saved France from defeat in 1914. A general's true abilities often arise from a combination of competence and character.

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