Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War, 1939-1940 by Shukman Harold. Sokokina Tatyana. Rzheshevskii Oleg Aleksandrovich. Kulʹkov E. N

Author:Shukman, Harold.,Sokokina, Tatyana.,Rzheshevskii, Oleg Aleksandrovich.,Kulʹkov, E. N.
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781135283018
Publisher: Taylor & Francis (CAM)

NOTES

1.

The Spanish Republican prime minister.

2.

This is a sarcastic reference to pacifists or non-combatants.

3.

That is, the occupation of Eastern Poland in accordance with the Molotov—Ribbentrop Pact.

4.

Not to be confused with Soviet Marshal Blyukher.

6.

Sixth Session: 17 April 1940, Morning

KULIK (Chairman): Comrade Kovalev has the floor.

KOVALEV (Army Commander 2nd Rank, Commander of Belorussia Special Military District): I am a District Commander. I shall say a few words about how we dispatched our forces. The fighting efficiency of the forces declined as they were formed and dispatched to the Finnish front, because the dispatching was carried out hastily, and we had to make replacements in our units that came from nearly all parts of my district.

I have claims to the General Staff, which are as follows. When all is said and done, the District commanders ought to have been told at least 10–15 days in advance what was in store for them. We received wired orders to dispatch units but had no time to man them properly. And the complaints from the front, namely, that either arriving units were understaffed or the first troop trains were not quite battle-worthy, are quite legitimate. Thus it was with the 4th Division. The division was stationed at the western border, and was digging trenches without any thought of being dispatched. The command was given three days before the dispatch of the first troop train, with all the supplies and the horses expected to be entrained already on the next troop trains; and the first forward regiment arrived in Leningrad undersupplied with horses. The Leningrad District rated the division, judging by its first regiment, as insufficiently battleworthy. When, however, all the troop trains arrived, the division was found to have all its horses, armaments, outfits, and be 100 per cent staffed.

The haste with which we were dispatched, and the lack of orientation of the commander — in this case the commander of Belorussia Military District — about which units might be taken to the Finnish front in the next 10–15 days, resulted in troops being dispatched not sufficiently well-knit. The command personnel had not enough time to familiarise themselves with the actual numbers we had provided for the units.

STALIN: And what about your District, did it know its divisions?

KOVALEV: It did, but this is how divisions were knocked together: initially, we prepared two divisions for Finland — the 113th and the 164th. The two divisions were prepared in full strength in 20 days, i.e., they were already well-knit; but then, these divisions were taken away, and the 4th and 8th were dispatched instead. And replacements for these divisions were provided from the 113th and 164th Divisions, the 113th and 164th Division were stripped down on General Staff orders and sent to the front. The troop trains of the 4th and 8th Divisions had hardly left the District when the order came to dispatch the 113th and 164th Divisions. Hence, 50 per cent of the actual numbers of the 113th and 164th Divisions had to be manned out of other units in the district.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.