Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security by Jiri Valenta William C. Potter

Author:Jiri Valenta, William C. Potter [Jiri Valenta, William C. Potter]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780367621346
Barnesnoble:
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Published: 2021-01-27T00:00:00+00:00

NOTES: CHAPTER 6

1 For accounts of the US proposal, its background and origin, and initial Soviet reactions, see John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973), pp. 86–95; and Raymond L. Garthoff, ‘SALT I: an evaluation’, World Politics, Vol. XXXI, no. 1 (October 1978), pp. 1–25.

2 These figures on US and Soviet strategic force levels, and others cited later, are drawn from authoritative sources including not only the unclassified versions of the Annual Reports (or ‘Posture Statements’) of the US Secretary of Defense, but also later declassified ‘sanitized’ versions of the classified reports, and the unofficial but well-informed annual Strategic Balance publication of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, including refinements and corrections presented in later years as well as those current for the dates indicated.

3 See, for example, Major General Nikolai A. Talensky, ‘Anti-missile systems and disarmament’, International Affairs (Moscow), no. 10 (October 1964), pp. 15–19. The author had occasion in 1966 to discuss this question with General Talensky, and sought to persuade him of the destabilizing effects of ABM deployment.

4 In particular, for statements from the early 1970s, see Leon Goure, Foy D. Kohler and Mose L. Harvey, The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy (Coral Gables, Fla: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1974), passim; Lawrence T. Caldwell, Soviet Attitudes to SALT, Adelphi Paper No. 75, Institute for Strategic Studies, London (1971), esp. pp. 6–19; Thomas W. Wolfe, ‘Soviet interests in SALT, in William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr (eds), SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970s (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh, 1973), pp. 21–54; Thomas W. Wolfe,‘Soviet approaches to SALT, Problems of Communism, Vol. XIX, no. 5 (September-October 1970), pp. 1–10; C. G. Jacobsen, Soviet Strategy - Soviet Foreign Policy (Glasgow: MacLehose, 1972), pp. 71–121; Thomas W. Wolfe, ‘Soviet interests in SALT: institutional and bureaucratic considerations’, in Frank B. Horton, III, Anthony C. Rogerson and Edward L. Warner, III (eds), Comparative Defense Policy (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), pp. 113–20; Thomas W. Wolft, Soviet Power and Europe, 1945–1970 (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), pp. 273–7, 437–41, 499–510; and Samuel B. Payne, Jr, ‘The Soviet debate on strategic arms limitation: 1968–72’, Soviet Studies, Vol. XXVII, no. 1 (January 1975), pp. 27–45. There have been even more numerous statements since the late 1970s.

5 Yuriy N. Listvinov, Pervyi Udar (First Strike) (Moscow: IMO, 1971), p. 183.

6 As quoted in ‘In the interest of strengthening peace: joint session of the foreign affairs commissions of the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet’, Izvestiia, 24 August 1972.

7 As quoted in ‘Important contribution to strengthening peace and security: session of the presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet’, Pravda, 30 September 1972.

8 In addition to the writings cited in note 4, above, see in particular the excellent discussion by Marshall D. Shulman, ‘SALT and the Soviet Union’, in Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelander (eds), SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond (New York: The Free Press/Macmillan, 1974), pp.

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