Rural Revitalization Through State-led Programs by Mingrui Shen

Author:Mingrui Shen
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9789811516603
Publisher: Springer Singapore

5.2.2 Interventional State and Rural Public Goods Provision

In contrast to the invisible role among most of the scholarly records of rural commodification , the state has demonstrated its notable dominance and strong intervention in the delivery of public goods . In China , the local government bears nearly complete fiscal responsibility for rural public goods provision (Sato 2008; Zhang et al. 2004). Whether the performance is a success or failure, the effects may be exclusively attributed to the almighty state.

To demystify rural economic growth and increased well-being of farmers in post-Mao China , a large volume of literature found that the state, especially the initiatives of local governments , has played an irreplaceable role (Cai and Treisman 2006; Che and Qian 1998; Landry 2008; Oi 1992; Whiting 2000) . Concerning public funding reform at the turn of the century , scholars noticed that the abolition of agricultural taxes caused a hollowing-out crisis of public finance at the grassroots (Smith 2010) . The intergovernmental fiscal transfers did not necessarily produce improvements in rural public goods (Sato 2008), while direct election of village leaders did yield benefits (Luo et al. 2007). State funding is absolutely not the cure-all for public goods provision in the countryside . Through implementation of a state-led road project in northern China , Zhou (2012) disclosed the unintended consequences that led to huge collective debts and erosion of the collective basis of rural governance . Assembled with wide-ranging observations of top-down programs, James Scott (1998) emphasized the perils of the interventional state . Those state-led programs were designated with great intention for public goods provision , but eventually led to disastrous consequences for the countryside in the global south. Other scholars have also emphasized the role of social organizations and networks in resource mobilization and rural problem-solving. Those social processes, incorporating village kinship, network ties, and communal trust, provide a basis for rural governance (Duara 1988; Huang 1990; Ostrom et al. 1999), and even encompass an informal accountability for public goods provision (Tsai 2007) .

Generally speaking, the public goods provision in China has followed a monocentric model . The state, as the central authority , often dominated all others in the public affairs of the countryside . Most empirical studies have explored the impact on rural governance exerted by variegated organs of the state, such as multi-level governments , departmental bureaucracies , state policies , and village cadres (Che and Qian 1998; Landry 2008; Oi 1992; Zhou 2012). Ostrom et al. (1999) advocated a polycentric system, in which each unit may exercise considerable independence to make and enforce rules within a circumscribed scope of authority , to deal with problems. Regarding the circumstance of the commodifying villages, this theory may inspire a new path for rural sustainability .

In rural areas , interactions among villagers are often reciprocal, following customs of informality , and are far from being embedded into so-called “institutional fabrics ” (Berger and Luckmann 1966) . Property rights in rural settings are often ambiguous; thus, corresponding goods produced or consumed in the public domain are difficult to classify.

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