Revolution 1989: The Fall of the Soviet Empire by Victor Sebestyen

Author:Victor Sebestyen [Sebestyen, Victor]
Language: eng
Format: azw3
Publisher: Orion
Published: 2009-07-30T04:00:00+00:00

The strikes continued throughout the summer and Wałesa put himself at the head of them. He was convinced now that this would be the final showdown with the Communists, but winning would be a laborious process. ‘I knew that the Communist system was finished,’ he said. ‘The problem was what would be the best way to get rid of it.’ He repeatedly pleaded for talks with the regime to form ‘an anti-crisis front’. General Jaruzelski always thought of himself as a realist. It was a conversation he had with Gorbachev that finally convinced him that it was time to face the fact that the government needed Solidarity. Some Communist reformers had been saying so for some time. His Foreign Minister, Marian Orzechowski, said: ‘Martial law could work only once . . . The army and the police cannot be mobilised against society again.’ The new Prime Minister, Mieczysław Rakowski, said that ‘in practice we have recognised the opposition as a lasting element in the country’s political map’, and it was time formally to accept the realities. Still, the General delayed.

On 12 July Gorbachev visited Warsaw and was given a rapturous reception by, mainly, Solidarity supporters. Jaruzelski told the Soviet leader that he was considering legalising Solidarity and negotiating with Wałesa. Gorbachev asked what he was waiting for and urged him on. Jaruzelski knew that the Soviets would do nothing to save him if his political skin was in danger and he had to look out for himself. The strikes had brought the country to a virtual halt. Poland was almost ungovernable. He had managed to obtain a loan of half a billion dollars from the Soviets to stave off immediate bankruptcy, but he realised that no money would be forthcoming from the West unless he could find a way to cut a deal with Solidarity.6

On 26 August Jaruzelski contacted Wałesa and proposed a ‘Round Table discussion’ to end the impasse facing Poland, but he left it up to his Interior Minister to work out the details. Kiszczak was a curious figure, a dapper sixty-three-year-old career intelligence officer who had much good humour and charm for a man of his profession. He established a curious relationship, almost a friendship, with the opposition even though he was their sworn enemy, the man who had presented the harsh face of military rule. He was one of the chief sponsors of the Round Table talks and did much to ensure their success, while simultaneously spying on the opposition. When he met Wałesa, he said Solidarity could be legalised, and that a wide range of democratic reforms could be introduced, if the union leader would get the striking workers to return to their jobs. Wałesa knew how high the stakes were. He calculated that he had to accept the offer, though breaking a strike yet again could risk undermining his authority within Solidarity. Many of his closest advisers warned him that he was making the biggest mistake of his life by entering into the talks.

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