Cold War in the Balkans: American Foreign Policy and the Emergence of Communist Bulgaria, 1943 1947 by Michael M. Boll

Author:Michael M. Boll [Boll, Michael M.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: International Relations, Communism; Post-Communism & Socialism, Diplomacy, Political Ideologies, Political Science, General
ISBN: 9780813115276
Google: DUcoEAAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 1632131
Publisher: University Press of Kentucky
Published: 1984-10-01T00:00:00+00:00

6 Planning for Postwar Bulgaria

No one who has inhabited the offices of the State or Defense departments during periods of change from one presidential administration to another ever forgets the creative confusion that overwhelms the everyday routine of business, confusion whose plasticity makes most difficult the historian’s efforts to impose form or coherence. Individuals once assumed to be placid and uncaring suddenly write daily memorandums to section heads, revealing whirlpools of personal and professional discontent where before indifference seemed to reign. Previous supporters of existing policy directives and their underlying assumptions take on a conservative posture, awaiting emergence of a new consensus they can join. And if such are the broad parameters of a normal shift from one presidency to another, the uncertainties, competition, and newly expressed opinions that accompanied Harry S. Truman’s elevation to Chief Executive contained several unique elements. The unknown proclivities of a man little schooled in the intrigues and intricacies of foreign policy presented a promising opportunity for diplomats long frustrated by Roosevelt’s insistence that foreign policy be tightly controlled by the president’s office. Truman’s willingness to rely upon State Department advice because, as he admitted, “he was not up on all the details of foreign affairs,” led a joyful Soviet specialist at State to remark that, unlike Roosevelt, the new president “was playing the game according to the rules.”1

The international scene contained new and unknown elements as well. By mid-April it was clear that victory over Germany was rapidly approaching, and the past reticence to challenge questionable Soviet behavior for fear of undermining the European alliance became increasingly difficult to justify. Even the long-assumed requirement for Soviet assistance in the continuing war against Japan became subject to close scrutiny in the new administration as analysts reexamined the room for diplomatic maneuver vis-à-vis Moscow. In early May, Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew requested the War and Navy departments to assess whether “the entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific War at the earliest possible moment [is] of such vital interest to the United States as to preclude any attempts by the United States Government to obtain Soviet agreement to certain desirable political objectives in the Far East prior to such entry.”2

It is clear in retrospect that the new president, though feeling bound by the general commitments of his predecessor, focused a suspicious eye upon the Soviets from his first days in office. It would not be he who would break faith with Roosevelt’s “grand design” but rather the Russians through noncompliance with existing pledges and agreements. And by the time of Foreign Minister Molotov’s visit to Washington in late April, such noncompliance was evident. As Truman informed Secretary of War Stimson, “Our agreements with the Soviet Union so far had been a one-way street and that could not continue; it was now or never.” When Stimson raised the issue of Soviet support for the soon-to-be-opened United Nations, Truman pointedly refuted past policy of overlooking Soviet transgressions for the sake of the new institution. Acknowledging

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