Wundt, Avenarius, and Scientific Psychology by Chiara Russo Krauss

Author:Chiara Russo Krauss
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9783030126377
Publisher: Springer International Publishing

According to Münsterberg , in psychology we cannot speak of the dependency upon the I of the original experience (the stellungnehmenden Ich, the I-that-takes-stand,) for two reasons: (1) because from this perspective we cannot establish any science, since science presupposes the theoretical-descriptive approach and (2) because the entire experience depends upon this I, so that speaking of the dependency upon this I does not define any specific field of investigation for psychology. Rather, to found psychology, we need a twofold step: (1) abstracting from the original I, that is to say, considering the experience as independent of the I-that-takes-stand in order to obtain the objectified empirical data that are the bases of all science and (2) regarding these data in their dependency upon the individual. So, this latter, psychological individual must be another kind of individual than the one of the original experience .

However, Münsterberg’s clarification of this second step does not seem directed against Avenarius, rather against other interpretation of the definition of psychology by point of view. In fact, when Avenarius talks about the dependency upon the individual, he never means the dependency upon the original subject, rather the functional relationship among certain empirical data (the assertions of the fellow men and their brains). Therefore, we need to specify that Münsterberg presents two different criticisms. (1) The first one is addressed to Avenarius and targets the absolutization of the theoretical perspective, that regards the descriptive and contemplative approach as the only one that is valid. The error of this position is overlooking the original perspective that includes values , ethical judgments, the I-that-takes-stand, etc. and (2) The second criticism is addressed to that particular interpretation of the definition of psychology by point of view of the dependency upon the individual, that wrongly identifies this individual with the I of the immediate experience , the I-that-takes-stand.

We should now ask, according to Münsterberg , who is the individual upon which the psychological experience depends?The psychical cannot be characterized by the dependency upon the I-that-takes-stand, nor by the dependency upon the I-that-is-found [vorgefundenen Ich]. The decisive relationship with the subject is the connection with a third I, namely the I-that-finds [vorfindende Ich], which remained as the condition for the existence of the objects after having imagined away the presentness of the actual I. (Münsterberg [1900] 1918, 71)

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