The Single-Neuron Theory by Steven Sevush

Author:Steven Sevush
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Springer International Publishing, Cham

Given these considerations, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that, at least in the split-brain case, there are two independent anatomical spheres of conscious experience, one situated in the left hemisphere, the other situated in the right. This contention has in fact been favored by most writers on the subject and almost all those who have worked directly with split-brain patients.33

A Matter of Terminology

Before proceeding, there is a matter of terminology that needs attention. In view of there potentially being more than one sphere of conscious experience present in a given brain, a potential ambiguity may arise with respect to which conscious experience is being referred to at any given time. To circumvent this difficulty, I will make a temporary distinction between what I will call “verbally reportable conscious experience” (vr-conscious experience) and “non-verbally reportable conscious experience” (nvr-conscious experience). By vr-conscious experience I mean the uniquely human form of conscious experience whose content is available for verbal report and whose production is mediated by the split-brain patient’s left hemisphere. Conscious experiences of this kind are associated with logical thinking, grammatical competence, a sense of future and past, and a well-developed sense of self. An example would be the type of conscious experience that you, the reader, are having right now as you read this paragraph and reflect upon what I am saying.

In contrast, by nvr-conscious experience I will mean the kind of conscious experience assumed to be present in nonhuman animals and very young children, and in the right hemisphere of the split-brain patient. Conscious experiences of this sort lack logic, grammar, sophisticated self-awareness, or sense of future and past.

Note that I am making this distinction solely for the purpose of facilitating the discussion that will take place in the next few chapters. I do not intend it as supportive of any specific philosophical position, such as, for example, Ned Block’s distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness.34 Later, in Chap. 11, when a workable mind/brain theory is in hand, I will in fact argue that all conscious experiences share the same basic mechanism.

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