Digging into Chaos by Christiane Suchanek

Author:Christiane Suchanek
Language: deu
Format: epub
ISBN: 9783828870819
Publisher: Tectum Verlag
Published: 2018-06-17T00:00:00+00:00

Figure 2: ANP Ratings 2012-2013 (Source: own figure, data provided by SIGAR 2014a, 5)

Despite the questionable quality of the assessment, it was obvious that in view of the scheduled end of the transition period and ISAF in 2014, there was only a “narrow window of opportunity” to fully develop the ANP’s capabilities 38 and ensure systematic oversight (SIGAR 2014a, 11). Yet the true capabilities of the police have to be questioned as the rating system itself created disincentives for the units to achieve top marks. As soon as units were rated accordingly, mentors and resources have been withdrawn entirely. Similarly, support for top rated ANA units was minimized and re-focused for lower-rating units. This was repeatedly stressed a major reason for backsliding in performance. Additionally, the rating system created incentives for CSTC-A staff to embellish the results: It was a self-assessment and training results were potentially related to the career of the advisors in charge (Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2013, 53, 76). Therefore, during transition, security responsibility was transferred to ANP units of questionable capabilities while oversight abilities were steadily decreasing. Current detailed capability assessments are not available. As of July 2017, SIGAR only reported that force readiness improved across all elements of the ANA and ANP (SIGAR 2017, 82).

Besides the opaque quality of the ANP, quantitative achievements too remain questionable. The target end-strength for both the ANP and ANA has been revised upwards several times, although original targets had probably not been reached. The current authorized target size for the ANP is 157,000 including all elements except the ALP. According to the DOD 2017 report, this target was not met as of April 2017 as the ANP counted 148,710 personnel (DOD 2017, 76-77). The “exact police force level has always been quite a mystery” as Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh (2013, 74) point out. Estimates concerning the number of police in service vary significantly. In 2007, the personnel charts reported 75,400 policemen, whereas UNAMA estimated a true number of 39,500. While the personnel charts in 2010 noted 122,000, EUPOL’s estimates reported 85,000 serving ANP (Giustozzi and Isaqzadeh 2013, 74). Since December 2014, it has been increasingly tried to address the problem by introducing the Afghanistan Human Resources Management System (AHRIMS). As of May 2017, the MOI verified that 70 percent of its personnel, which includes the ANP, are enrolled in AHRIMS – an increase of 35 percent within a quarter. The enrolment of both the ANA and the ANP in AHRIMS is scheduled to be completed by end of 2017. The incomplete registration of personnel nevertheless underlines the risk of “ghost” personnel. Therefore, the establishment of AHRIMS in addition to the Afghan Personnel Pay System (APPS) increases transparency and tackles the risk of not-existing staff on public payrolls (SIGAR 2017, 101-103). Yet the long-standing uncertainty about the true number of policemen leaves marks on the overall efficiency and effectiveness of training measures.

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