Central Peripheries by Marlene Laruelle

Author:Marlene Laruelle
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781800080164
Publisher: UCL Press
Published: 2021-06-19T17:43:43+00:00

Eurasianism as Kazakhstan’s state ideology

Far from being merely a Kazakh literary tradition elaborated during Soviet times, Eurasianism has been officialized as Kazakhstan’s state ideology, functioning, as Luca Anceschi puts it, in ‘quasi-symbiotic relationship [with] authoritarianism’.10 Immediately after independence, in the first half of the 1990s, Kazakhstan began branding itself as ‘the heart of Eurasia’. As Nazarbayev declared: ‘Kazakhstan is a unique state in Asia where European and Asian roots are intertwined … The combination of different cultures and traditions allows us to absorb what is best in European and in Asian culture’.11 This geographical centrality in Eurasia is captured by a sculpture in Zhastar Ayabagy Park in Astana through the explicit metaphor of a heart whose central red point suggests Kazakhstan.12

To compete with Uzbek President Islam Karimov, who advanced the notion of Turkestan, Nazarbayev referred to Eurasia in many of his texts. His 2005 book In the Heart of Eurasia (V serdtse Evrazii) encapsulates this Eurasianist commitment. He institutionalized this allegiance to Eurasianism by founding, in 1996, the Lev N. Gumilev Eurasian University in Astana on the foundations of the city’s former pedagogical institute. During the celebrations of ten years of independence held at the university in 2001, the famous Kyrgyz writer Chingiz Aitmatov spoke favourably about Kazakhstan’s Eurasianism and the decision to name the University after Gumilev, which he called a confirmation of Kazakhstan’s status as the epicentre of Eurasia.13

Nazarbayev gave his personal blessing to this official reference to Gumilev: just as in Tatarstan, the Kazakhstani authorities subscribe to a positive view of Gumilev’s legacy, both in Eurasian history and ethnic theories. Since then, the university has regularly organized conferences on Eurasianism as well as lectures on Gumilev’s work. It even launched its own Eurasian Centre, which was charged ‘to define a conception of Eurasianism that would respond to Kazakhstan’s national interests; to develop a geopolitical methodology for the historical, socio-economic, and ideological interpretation of the development of contemporary civilization; and to advise state, educational, and academic organizations on Eurasianism’.14 One of its former directors, Seit Kaskabasov, buttressed the president’s vision of Kazakhstan’s Eurasian mission with more elaborate historical arguments. He stated, for instance, that there exist three Eurasian states – Russia and Kazakhstan (both heirs to the Mongol Empire), and Turkey (with its Byzantine and Ottoman heritage) – that must jointly constitute a new trans-Eurasian axis. According to this logic, Kazakhstan holds the status of first among equals, as it finds itself geographically located between the other two powers.15

This state-backed Eurasianism results from the regime’s need for securitization. At its independence, Kazakhstan had to deal with a massive Russian minority and the risk that northern regions might secede. A pragmatic way of ensuring stability was thus to promote the birth of a civic and supra-ethnic Kazakhstani identity, to offer an official status to the Russian language and to insist on Russia as the country’s main partner. At the same time, Nazarbayev could not afford to lose his political clout to Kazakhstan’s nationalist opposition: he had to appear to be defending the Kazakh nation.

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