Jozef Pilsudski by Antoni Lenkiewicz

Author:Antoni Lenkiewicz
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Winged Hussar Publishing, LLC
Published: 2019-08-26T23:01:04+00:00

After a few days of the Soviet offensive, Piłsudski became aware that it was taking place on a set pattern, where the best units of the Red Army attacked our units at their weakest points and began flanking maneuvers. This caused our withdrawal to another defensive line. The Polish retreat on 5-6 July caused the loss of Vilnius, Lida, and Grodno. From 21 July, heavy fighting took place near Zbrucz. Attempts to stop the Bolsheviks on the line of old German trenches, left over from the World War, and plans to set up a defensive line on the Bug River proved to be impossible to implement.

The goal of the Soviet offensive was Warsaw. In the plans drawn up by the Bolsheviks, taking Warsaw would mean the end of the Polish government, and the end of the first phase in their plan to bring revolution to all of Europe. The battles of August of 1920 were to decide if the Polish Republic would continue to exist. Its army was falling back while fighting ferocious battles, and as it did so, in a natural and indefensible way it was also losing faith in any kind of eventual victory. Would the Polish forces be able to halt the hordes which were growing ever surer of their power? These were questions posed by nearly all Poles, but the answers were less confident.

Among the questions regarding the tactics applied by Józef Piłsudski during the war with Soviet Russia in 1920 are accusations that since he had different ideas about waging war, why did he not remove those generals who permitted the errors which led to catastrophic results? These kinds of questions can be multiplied, and they have appeared ad infinitum in many anti-Piłsudski publications. But the most convincing answers to those kinds of questions and accusations are contained in the Marshal’s own writings. I had a choice. I could change the general on the front line or accept his understanding of the situation, because I preferred to have a bad solution, but a confident commander. I chose the second option but indicated the necessity of organizing a strategic withdrawal according to my own concepts.

Piłsudski implemented changes among the commanders only at the end of July. General Szeptycki was replaced by Gen. Józef Haller,89 and Gen. Zygadłowicz,90 commander of the First Army, by Gen. Romer. It must be added that the entire officer corps had a consistent attitude toward the obligatory strategic thought. All the generals routinely held sacred the current military doctrine of: position, cordon, line, trench. Why didn’t the Marshal personally go to the front line and take over command?

To be aware of the complexity and difficulty of making this type of decision, one must remember that Piłsudski was not only the Commander-in-Chief, but also the Head of State. There was also trouble in the government. Leadership positions were being taken by weak persons, those with low confidence or even cowards. The Sejm sent plaintive notes to Moscow begging for peace. Piłsudski’s absence from

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