Vol 4 – Issue 2 by Catalyst

Author:Catalyst
Language: eng
Format: epub
Published: 2022-08-25T20:36:36+00:00

# Asef Bayat. Revolution without Revolutionaries: Making Sense of the Arab Spring (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017), 16.

# “Nasser refused to use the iron fist [to overturn capitalism], not because of signals from the countries of the core (they abounded) nor because of his class predilections, if he had any. Rather, his course was set by his very real unwillingness to sacrifice, as he put it, the present generation for those of the future and unleash potentially uncontrollable elements of class conflict.” John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: the Political Economy of Two Regimes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

# The exception was Libya; due to oil rents, they were able to maintain redistribution and subordinate the capitalist class — which was very small to begin with.

# Some authors treat the post-1970s Arab regimes as bureaucratic authoritarian; see, for example, Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 14, 16, 268; Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat,Ch. 1. Others refer to the pre- and post-1970s regimes as populist authoritarian; e.g., Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution From Above (London: Routledge, 2001). The concept of bureaucratic authoritarianism was developed in the Latin American context to refer to a form of state development that seeks to deepen industrialization through an alliance with domestic and foreign capital; here, I am adapting the term for the Middle Eastern context to emphasize the state’s autonomy and its modus vivendi with capital.

# For example, Sadat was unable to end Nasser’s guaranteed employment scheme, which was placing strain on the state budget, so the state increased the waiting period for new graduates to obtain a public-sector job.

# Of course, this dynamic was not unique to the Middle East but featured across the Global South. In the Middle East, however, state autonomy was perhaps greater, and the efforts to constrain the private sector through a balancing act more ambitious, than elsewhere.

# Richard H. Adams Jr and John Page, “Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Selected Middle East and North Africa Countries, 1980–2000,” World Development 31, no. 12 (2003): 2027–48.

# Farrukh Iqbal and Youssouf Kiendrebeogo, “The Determinants of Child Mortality Reduction in the Middle East and North Africa,” Middle East Development Journal 8, no. 2 (2016): 230–47.

# Philippe C. Schmitter, “Still the Century of Corporatism?” The Review of Politics 36, no. 1 (1974): 85–131.

# Hinnebusch, Revolution, 121.

# Hinnebusch, Revolution, 121.

# Corporatist rule was the model deployed in one-party states across the Global South; for a comparison of Juan Perón to Nasser, for example, see Robert Bianchi, Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth-Century Egypt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 27–8.

# Giacomo Luciani, “Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework,” in Giacomo Luciani, ed., The Arab State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 65–84.

# Leonard Robinson, “Rentierism and Foreign Policy in Syria,” The Arab Studies Journal 4, no. 1 (Spring 1996), 34–54.

# Tarik M. Yousef, “Employment, Development and the Social Contract in the Middle East and North Africa,” World Bank (Washington, DC, 2004).

# Adam Hanieh, Lineages of Revolt: Issues of Contemporary Capitalism in the Middle East (Chicago: Haymarket, 2013).

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