The Ethics of Insurgency by Michael L. Gross

Author:Michael L. Gross [Gross, Michael L.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2015-01-12T00:00:00+00:00

Permissible Attacks on Liable Civilians

Philosophers (and politicians) who consider the permissibility of terrorism draw two lines. One rules out terrorism, that is, direct lethal attacks on noncombatants, but permits deadly strikes against high-ranking civilians (Chapter 5; also Corlett 2003). The assassination of Hamas leaders noted in Chapter 5 is a case in point. The second line, which I pursue here, also proscribes terrorism but permits direct attacks on civilian structures and property if unaccompanied by injury or loss of life. The first aims to disable civilians who take on a direct, war-fighting role. The second hopes to intimidate noncombatants to force government leaders to alter their policy and/or to disable facilities that provide war-sustaining services. Ascriptions of liability surface in all cases.

The Liability of Noncombatants

International law and orthodox just war theory prohibit attacks on noncombatants and, indeed, on any civilian target, absolutely. This is the principle of noncombatant immunity. Revisionist theories, on the other hand, impute a measure of liability to civilians who help sustain an unjust war. In Jeff McMahan’s (2009:219 emphasis added) view, for example, “Civilian complicity in an unjust war may also be relevant to the justification of the intentional destruction of civilian property as a means of applying pressure to a government and its civilian supporters.” Benbaji (2013:176, emphasis added) presents a more detailed position:

... in order to deter civil society from perpetuating occupation and colonization, freedom fighters are allowed to target civil society, i.e., violate its public space, by destroying buildings, streets and public institutions, in those rare cases in which this is necessary for attaining (what they believe to be) a legitimate goal. Notwithstanding this leniency, militants ought to do whatever they can in order to avoid killing or harming enemy civilians (while attacking the civil society of which these civilians are a part).

Guerrillas and insurgents “deter” civilians from perpetuating injustice by forcing them to pay a high price. The reason for targeting some civilian objects directly, a grave violation of humanitarian law, returns to liability, albeit collective liability. Unable to assign individual culpability to civilians, Benbaji (2013: 195): suggests “treating society as if it is responsible for the evil against which [freedom fighters] fight.” Thus the public sphere is fair game while noncombatant lives remain protected. Underlying this argument is a broad view of civilian culpability coupled with a very sharp distinction between death and injury on one hand, and the destruction of property on the other. Both claims are problematic but not without remedy.

Although the destruction of some “public institutions,” such as a government building or financial institution that provides war-sustaining aid, is often permissible, Benbaji, like McMahan, permits the more general destruction of civilian buildings, roads, and commons because all unjust civilians bear a measure of liability. While this claim has some intuitive basis, it fails for many pragmatic and moral reasons. Putting aside the epistemic difficulties of sometimes determining an unjust war, it remains nonetheless difficult to assign liability with any accuracy or consistency. When civilians join a state’s war-sustaining

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