The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1940-1943 by Matthew Powell

Author:Matthew Powell
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK, London

124.Byford, ‘Fair Stood’, p. 52. Byford, ‘The Battle’, p. 69.

125.Hall, Strategy for Victory, pp. 105–6, 102.

126.TNA AIR 20/4301, Proposals for an Army Co-operation Command—Responsibilities of the Directorate of Military Co-operation, c.October 1940.

© The Author(s) 2016

Matthew PowellThe Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1940-194310.1057/978-1-137-54417-9_4

4. The Work of Army Co-operation Command , 1941

Matthew Powell1

(1)Cwmbran, UK

As Army Co-operation Command began the overall role assigned to it in 1941, it experienced, as should be expected with any newly created organisation, a degree of teething problems. Major modifications were required both to the Command’s internal organisation and its position with regard to non-RAF military organisations within Britain. This was particularly the case with the army’s Home Forces. The roles, responsibilities and even location of some of Barratt’s subordinate commanders required a major overhaul as they were unworkable in the form that had been agreed between the Air and General Staffs prior to Under the present arrangement th’s creation in the autumn of 1940. There were also still high-level tensions between the Air Ministry and War Office over the development of tactical air power in Britain. One area of particular worry was how Army Co-operation Command and the War Office would communicate, especially over progress on developing operational procedures.

Despite these many issues, Barratt and his staff set about confronting some of the major issues that had plagued tactical air power prior to and during the Second World War to date. They used First World War experiences and interwar exercises to guide them in this process. The British strategic outlook in 1941 gave Army Co-operation Command the necessary time to reorganise and prepare further tactical air power developments—with the continent dominated by Germany after the defeat of France, the U-Boat threat in the Atlantic hampering British communications with the US and the empire, and the Italian invasion of North Africa, the country’s focus was on non-European theatres of operation. The focus of the RAF as a whole at this time remained on the strategic air offensive against Germany and not tactical air power—this was the only effective way of carrying the fight to the German homeland and also keeping friendly but neutral powers such as the US interested in events in Europe. The fear of invasion had receded to a degree with Fighter Command’s victory in the Battle of Britain but was still a real concern and no plans were being made to launch a seaborne invasion against the French coast in the near future. 1

In 1941, Army Co-operation Command continued its most fruitful experimentation in the refining of artillery reconnaissance and spotting that had been postponed during the Battle of France. Its work was a prime example of how to operate effectively and smoothly with branches of the army, overcoming differences and improving relations, and showed promise for further co-operative ventures. As will be discussed below, however, Army Co-operation Command’s operational restrictions also prevented this positive opportunity for expansion. 2 These restrictions were primarily due to the way in which the Air Staff had created Army

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