The Cambridge Companion to the Summa Theologiae (Cambridge Companions to Religion) by

Language: eng
Format: azw
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2016-03-27T16:00:00+00:00

Aquinas’ account of happiness

Aquinas’ metaphysics and philosophy of nature are clearly indebted to Aristotle, although it is difficult to say how far, or in what ways, he transforms Aristotle in the process of adapting him. At any rate, Aquinas clearly appropriates an Aristotelian account of perfection as the fullest possible development of one’s active powers, taking this as the cornerstone for his own analysis of happiness. This is apparent in the first question of the Prima Secundae, which takes up the question of the final end of human life abstractly considered. After establishing that it is proper to the human person to act for an end and drawing out some of the implications of that claim (I-II.1.1–3), he goes on to argue that human life has an ultimate end, at least in a minimal sense that would rule out an indefinite series or a plurality of ends (I-II.1.4). Clearly, this claim is only plausible if the end is formulated in general terms, and so it is not surprising to read further that each person has one ultimate end, namely perfection understood as the fullest possible development and exercise of one’s active powers (I-II.1.5). What is more, each person desires and does everything on account of this end (I-II.1.6). All human beings share in the same final end, insofar as each person naturally desires his or her perfection, even though individuals differ widely in their conceptions of what it would mean to enjoy a perfect, or complete or fulfilled, human life (I-II.1.7).

So far, what we have is an extended application of the Aristotelian idea that perfection – that is to say, the full development and expression of one’s natural capacities and inclinations – constitutes the final cause, the architectonic aim, for the operations of every substantial creature. What does this have to do with happiness? We have already observed that Aquinas defines happiness as the ultimate perfection of a rational or intellectual nature (the latter referring to the angels; again, see I.62.1). On this basis, he moves from his analysis of the end of human life, generally considered, to a more focused analysis of the concept of happiness (I-II.2–5). He sets out, first of all, to give a substantive meaning to the formal concept of happiness as perfection, and after rejecting various alternatives (I-II.2.1–7), he concludes that the final end of human life can only be God, attained through contemplation – an answer which could have been given in pre-Christian antiquity, except for the further qualification that the mode of attainment in question utterly transcends the natural capacities of the human (or any other kind of) creature (I-II.2.8; cf. I.12.4, I-II.5.5).

In the following question, ‘What is happiness?’ Aquinas further develops this line of analysis. He argues that properly understood, happiness is an operation, because it is the ultimate perfection of the human creature, and to be perfect simply means to be in act (I-II.3.2). Further, it is an act of the highest and most characteristic human faculty, the intellect, although this act is necessarily conjoined with delight, which is an act of the will (I-II.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.