Tales from Albarado by Smoki Musaraj

Author:Smoki Musaraj [Musaraj, Smoki]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Social Science, Anthropology, Cultural & Social, History, Europe, Eastern, Business & Economics, Personal Finance, General
ISBN: 9781501750359
Google: 3QO0DwAAQBAJ
Publisher: Cornell University Press
Published: 2020-08-15T04:28:04+00:00

Making and Breaking Social Ties

Kreditorë emphasized social ties as a source of trust in their financial transactions with the firms. They repeatedly referred to sekserë and të njohur to emphasize their relationships with the firms. They went out of their way to show that they did not invest their money in an abstract and distant entity but with someone they knew and trusted, someone who had reassured the kreditorë of the stacks of cash in the coffers of the firms or who had invested their own money. By emphasizing social relations, trust, and familiarity with the firms, kreditorë thus insisted on a personalized and socialized rather than abstract and disembedded finance.5 These transactions also strengthened social ties. Participation at the firms brought people closer together. Deals with the firms were a source of excitement; kin engaged in passionate conversations about future investment plans or enjoyed acts of conspicuous consumption (lavish dinners in restaurants, hosting feasts) thanks to the firms’s returns.

The firms’ collapse impacted social ties. Some blamed sekserë for inciting people to participate or for misinforming them about the terms of their contracts with the firms. Ermira, a cashier at one of the firms, noted that “in Vlora, sekserë did a lot of dirty things [bënë shumë pislliqe].” Like Ermira, many others described how some sekserë took a significant cut from the interest returns from the kreditorë they represented, often without the latter’s knowledge. For instance, Skënder depicted sekserë as untrustworthy people, “who committed fraud.” He noted that he deposited his money himself every three months but that this entailed waiting in long lines. One day, he ran into a friend qua sekser who told him: “I have a të njohur here that finishes up the deal quickly.” He told the sekser he wanted to “lock his money” for three months but, instead, the sekser “locked it” for one year without Skënder’s knowledge. There was a significant difference in the interest applied to these two timeframes. Three-month deposits accumulated 5 percent interest, whereas yearlong deposits accrued 10 percent interest. The sekser would give him a small amount of cash every three months, “pretending the account was locked for three-month deposits.” One day, when he went to the firm directly to withdraw his interest, the teller of the branch told Skënder that, according to their records, his account was locked for a year. From his calculations, the sekser had made around US$6,000 on his money. The one-year contract cost Skënder his entire deposit because he was not able to withdraw the money before his due date, which was set past the date the firm collapsed. Although this was beyond the sekser’s control, Skënder could not help but blame the sekser for his losses.

In Skënder’s case, the sekser was a distant acquaintance, so it was easy to cut ties. But in other instances, when the sekser was close kin, the negotiation of relationships was more complicated. Some kreditorë reported chilled relationships with sekserë and të njohur; others maintained contact and relationality despite the losses.

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