Joan of Arc: A Military Leader by DeVries Kelly

Author:DeVries, Kelly [DeVries, Kelly]
Language: eng
Format: azw3
Tags: Joan of Arc
ISBN: 9780752468341
Publisher: The History Press
Published: 2011-09-29T16:00:00+00:00

6

The Road to Reims

The road to Reims lay open, but that did not mean that it was without ‘potholes’ or other hindrances. Between Orléans and Reims there were many towns and villages held by the English and Burgundians, and they could all have been impediments to a French army intent on crowning its king at the sacred site of such ceremonies, Reims Cathedral, especially as Reims itself was also under Burgundian control. Should each of these towns, as well as the city of Reims, require a military operation like that carried out on Jargeau, Meung-sur-Loire, and Beaugency, the coronation would be greatly delayed.

But there was some hope in the wake of the battle of Patay. The townspeople of Janville had barred the English from returning within their town’s walls, essentially surrendering themselves to the French soldiers who were pursuing the fleeing English. And Janville was not alone. Both Jacques Bouvier, the herald of Berry, and the Chronique de la Pucelle indicate that other English-controlled towns and villages Mehun, Ferté-Hubert, Montpeyroux, and Saint-Simeon, also surrendered themselves to the French after Patay without violence or bloodshed.1 It is of course easy to understand why these towns did this. Besides the simple fact that their inhabitants were French themselves, and in most instances had not been under English rule for long enough to formulate solid political or economic bonds, these citizens also could not help but recognize the newly acquired martial skill of the French or the destructiveness that followed an attempted hold-out against them. What had occurred at Jargeau was known widely throughout the land – and not only the ruin of the town’s fortifications, church, and some houses, which obviously had resulted in grievous and long-term financial setbacks, but also the execution of the prisoners there. Whether Joan knew about or participated in these executions, and whether or not the victims were only Englishmen, the effect of this incident and what it could mean to other towns undoubtedly frightened some citizens into desiring submission.

But they could not have surrendered if there had been large English or Burgundian garrisons in their towns. Why these garrisons were not in place cannot be explained by the settlements’ size, although it is certain that some of the villages and towns in occupied France were simply too small to warrant a gathering of troops. But there were also no garrisons or only small garrisons in far larger towns than those that surrendered after Patay, even towns the size of Auxerre, Châlons, Troyes, and, in fact, Reims itself. The reason for this is, in fact, somewhat complicated, yet it is fundamental to the very nature of fifteenth-century combat. Although this has not been realized by most Hundred Years War historians, especially English ones, the English forces that occupied France in 1429 really had no justifiable reason for their success there. After all, England was a far less populated kingdom than France. Comparative demographic figures show a disparity of more than 300 per cent.2 This of course meant that the potential number of soldiers from England was much smaller than that from France.

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