Islam, Liberalism, and Ontology (Routledge Studies in Religion and Politics) by Joseph J. Kaminski

Islam, Liberalism, and Ontology (Routledge Studies in Religion and Politics) by Joseph J. Kaminski

Author:Joseph J. Kaminski [Kaminski, Joseph J.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Taylor and Francis
Published: 2021-03-29T18:30:00+00:00


Connecting the discourse of universal human rights with moral epistemologies

Despite his shortcomings, Locke undeniably paved the way for what would eventually become the version of universal liberal human rights articulated in the twentieth century. According to Locke (1823c, TT, v.5, ch. 2[§6] p. 341):

The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that Iaw, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.

Much like his predecessor, Hugo Grotius, Locke’s iteration of natural rights was not dependent upon citizenship or any specific law of the state. These natural rights were also not necessarily limited to any particular ethnic, cultural, or religious group either; rather they were universal and derived from God since we were all created by the same God. For Locke, ultimately, we are all God’s property, and an affront to God’s property is an affront to God himself:

For men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise maker, all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order and about his business, they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another’s pleasure.

(1823c, TT, v.5, ch. 2[§6] p. 341)

Locke’s position does not begin with rights, per se, but it does hinge upon the “obligation of everyone to obey the law of nature” because man represented the divine workmanship of God (Freeman, 2004, p. 388). This, of course, is a speculative argument that begs the question: where does God explicitly iterate these rights that Locke refers to?

The answer is that God did not explicitly iterate these rights; he iterated certain laws to follow that can be derived from the Bible, but for Locke it appears that no such explicit textual/revealed source can be pointed to for rights. This is because natural rights derive from natural law which itself exists within nature and is readily recognizable by man via his own rational faculties. It is also important to note that, for Locke, divine law and natural law were not at odds. How was Locke able to ensure this?

The answer is rather straightforward actually. Locke simply interpreted natural law in a way that was consistent with Biblical teachings. At the same, however, Locke also made Biblical teachings fit within a liberal understanding of the world. According to Parekh (2006, p. 88), Locke allowed for the liberal worldview to rearticulate Christianity “in standard liberal idioms” and he achieved this by turning “Christianity into a ‘reasonable’ doctrine by stripping it of its theological mysteries, reducing its highly complex ethic to a simplified morality of bourgeois reciprocity, and turning churches into voluntary associations.” In essence, Locke made his Biblical scriptural interpretations fit within his own iteration of natural law which Parekh understands as a “simplified morality of bourgeois reciprocity” with a heavy emphasis on property rights. This is what allowed for Locke’s theory to accommodate both divine law and natural law at the same time.



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