Edward III (The English Monarchs Series) by W Mark Ormrod

Author:W Mark Ormrod [Ormrod, W Mark]
Language: eng
Format: azw3
ISBN: 9780300119107
Publisher: Yale University Press
Published: 2012-01-23T16:00:00+00:00

Chapter 14

THE RANSOMING OF RULERS , 1356–1360

If any confirmation was needed of the invincibility of English arms after the time of Crécy and Neville's Cross, then the battle of Poitiers provided it in truly miraculous form. Edward III and the Black Prince had never stood higher in the estimation of their subjects at home or their allies and enemies abroad. Edward's possession of both his principal enemies, David of Scotland and John of France, seemed set to transform the crown of England into the most powerful political force in western Europe. Speculation was rife as to the likely reach of the settlement that might follow. In March 1357 the Oxford scholar John Ashenden completed an astrological treatise in which he predicted that, after another great spate of pestilence, tempest and war, the kingdom of France would be utterly ruined and the king of England would finally have full dominion there.1

The great challenge that faced Edward III between 1356 and 1360 was to balance his allies’ and subjects’ inflated expectations of such a settlement against the many practical impediments that still stood in its way. Considering the great flurry of diplomatic activity that resulted from the battle of Poitiers, the negotiations with the Scots and French are surprisingly poorly documented. Both Edward and his captives recognized the perilous path they had to tread, and at times the three kings seem to have entered into a pact of secrecy to which neither their advisers nor posterity had any real access. English chroniclers of the period were often misinformed and confused. Furthermore, the official records of parliament are missing for the period 1357–61.2 In broad terms, however, it is evident that Edward III tried to formulate a diplomatic strategy based on three firm principles. The first was to secure as large a ransom as possible for the release of David Bruce and John of Valois. The second was to effect, as quickly as possible, a territorial settlement in France that would allow England to take control, in full sovereignty, of its ancient rights and new conquests in Aquitaine, Ponthieu and Calais. The third, which proved the trickiest position to sustain, was to reserve Edward's own claims to the thrones of Scotland and France as a means both of guaranteeing the ransoms and of securing promises of further titles and territories to follow. By charting the ways in which the king sought to balance these three objectives, we can reach a reasonable understanding of the aims of Edwardian diplomacy and of the problematic reactions it sometimes provoked not only in Scotland and France but also among the political elite within England.

Edward III spent the winter and spring of 1356–7 in careful consideration of his new position in France.3 John II, now languishing in the archiepiscopal palace in Bordeaux, frantically sought means by which to secure his release and restore order to his imperilled realm. But neither the king of England nor the French government showed any enthusiasm for John's proposal to draw in the emperor, Charles IV, as an arbiter for peace.

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