Doomsday or Deterrence?: On the Antinuclear Issue by Ferenc Fehér & Ágnes Heller

Author:Ferenc Fehér & Ágnes Heller [Fehér, Ferenc & Heller, Ágnes]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: International Relations, General, Peace, Arms Control, Political Science, Security (National & International)
ISBN: 9781317228783
Google: -nl0DwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 41388664
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2016-02-22T00:00:00+00:00

Notes

*If one casts a glance at such highly praised academic works as Russia and the Road to Appeasement and Russia and World Order by G. Liska (Johns Hopkins University Press), one will witness the same basic formula.

†The category is near Castoriadis’s “imaginary institution,” but it is not identical with it. We do not have space here to discuss the differences.

*It is the just irony of history that toward the end of his political career Khrushchev met a new opposition, in the group of Mao, which charged him with too much caution and making too many concessions.

*Admittedly, this continuity is not complete. Khrushchev was sometimes much too concerned with inner Soviet political stability to enforce budget cuts that the military resented and which have never happened since. He underestimated, inconsistently, the role of the surface fleet in an expansionist policy. His famous remark made during a visit to London testifies to this. There he suggested that the cruiser Sverdlov, on which he made his trip, could be purchased then and there, as only imperialist powers need gigantic fleets (a remark which would not have been to the liking of Admiral Gorshkov, now the head of perhaps the greatest single fleet in the world). However, these were inconsistencies within a policy formula that has remained valid.

*André Glucksmann, La Force du Vertige (Paris: Grasset, 1983), p. 52.

*Victor Zaslavsky, The Neo-Stalinist State (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1982).

†F. Dostoevsky, The Devils (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1957), p.258.

*Cornelius Castoriadis, Devant la guerre (Paris: Fayard, 1981), in particular pp. 251–64.

*The meaning of this internationalism is well known: “the internationalist support” the Soviet Army lent to its Hungarian, Czechoslovak, and other “class brethren” in the form of interventions.

*One such attempt to deny this can be seen with Rudolf Augstein who, in the pages of Der Spiegel, relies on the authority of Roy Medvedev, the oppositional Khrushchevite historian who sometimes proffers a better apology for the regime than official chroniclers. Against this legend the following facts should be recounted. From the time (mainly under Catherine the Great) Russia began to modernize and “Europeanize” its bureaucratic system and social affairs, including its legislative processes, a Russian political presence in European affairs, especially in Central Europe (by which we mean the areas now called Germany and Austria and related parts of what was then the Hapsburg Empire) was clear, unambiguous, and menacing. It is the authoritative view of Albert Sorel that, in its early crucial years, the French Revolution was saved by the fact that both Austria and Prussia, fighting each other to partition Poland, were mesmerized and paralyzed by their common fear of Russia. After the collapse of Napoleon, when the legendary Cossacks were very materially present in Paris, two of Metternich’s(!) main dilemmas (see H. Kissinger, A World Restored) were whether the Russian army would return at all and, generally, how to terminate the “revolutionary” policy of Alexander I (where “revolutionary” simply meant the upsetting of the conservative status quo ante). Ever since the French revolutionary wars, in which Russian

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