China as a Twenty-First-Century Naval Power by Michael McDevitt

Author:Michael McDevitt
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
Published: 2020-10-14T16:00:00+00:00

CHAPTER EIGHT

Opposite Sides of the Same Coin

Maritime Power and the PLA Navy

This book has briefly explored the operational history of the PLA Navy in the twenty-first century as it matured and expanded beyond the imagination of most foreign observers, perhaps even beyond the hopes and dreams of some within the navy itself. It has explored how the PLA Navy might be employed at home and abroad and has speculated that it may be on a trajectory leading to permanently deployed major naval formations in the western Indian Ocean. The Chinese achieved none of this by accident. The world is witnessing the fruits of careful, long-range strategic planning, mixed with what the Chinese themselves would call “the objective facts” of the PRC’s geoeconomic circumstances. These “facts” have resulted in a truly remarkable public acknowledgement from the military of an ancient continental power that “the traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests.”1 “Managing oceans” starts with control, and “protecting interests” requires a navy. As those interests grew, so too did the necessity for a great one. If there were any doubts about this within China’s leadership, especially in senior uniformed ranks, what seems to have tipped the scales toward greatness, to world-class stature, is the ambition—what Xi Jinping has dubbed the “China Dream”—to restore (as Xi sees it) the nation to a position of global preeminence. This is not the vision of Xi alone; his predecessor too linked military power with growing global stature.

The PRC’s newfound enthusiasm for things maritime of necessity required development of all the capabilities associated with maritime power, especially shipbuilding, a large merchant marine under the state’s control, and first-rate port facilities. The PRC has done all of this and more. Restoring what the Chinese consider China’s ancient position of centrality takes more than rhetorical exhortations. It takes the tangible capacity and capability that the PRC’s go-out strategy brings. Announced in 1999, “going out” unleashed a torrent of investment around the world, accompanied by characteristic Chinese entrepreneurial skill. The aim was to gather foreign know-how by purchase or other means, secure guaranteed access to raw materials and food, and create business opportunities abroad, many of them dedicated to global, especially maritime, trade.2 As many observers have noted, “going out” might be better called “going global,” with the Belt and Road Initiative as the primary example.

Beijing realizes that its maritime great-power goal encompasses more than just naval strength; Xi Jinping’s goal that the PLA Navy became “a world-class navy” is widely seen—correctly, in my judgment—as a prerequisite of great maritime power. For Xi, building China into a maritime power “is of great and far-reaching significance for promoting sustained and healthy economic development, safeguarding national sovereignty, security and development interests, realizing the goal of completing the building of a well-off society, and subsequently realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”3 This linkage—maritime power with the China Dream—makes it

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