Beyond the Control of God? by Paul M. Gould

Author:Paul M. Gould
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Six Views on the Problem of God and Abstract Objects
ISBN: 9781623569372
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
Published: 2014-05-25T16:00:00+00:00

Graham Oppy

Welty argues that propositions and possible worlds are thoughts in the mind of God. His case has three main parts. First, he argues for the existence and necessity of propositions and possible worlds. Second, he argues for six “conditions” on successful theories of propositions and possible worlds: objectivity, necessity, intentionality, relevance, plenitude, and simplicity. Third, he argues that only the view that propositions and possible worlds are thoughts in the mind of God satisfies all six conditions.

Much of what I would say in criticism of Welty’s views I have already said in criticism of the views of Gould and Davis (and in my initial discussion of Plantinga). I shall try not to repeat that criticism here.

Welty does not spell out his “grammatical” and “quantificational” arguments for the existence of propositions. I do not see how appeal to merely linguistic considerations could favor realism over fictionalism; I am skeptical that there could be a successful filling out of these arguments. I say the same about Welty’s “argument from ordinary language” for the existence of possible worlds. Moreover, I insist that his “argument from explanatory utility” for possible worlds is incomplete: Whatever explanatory utility may accrue to the postulation of possible worlds must be balanced against other theoretical costs, and all competing comprehensive metaphysical theories should be weighed. For all that Welty says, it may be that the best comprehensive metaphysical theories are fictionalist about possible worlds (and propositions).

Welty says that possible worlds are “entities that represent the world” and “objects that represent the universe as being such-and-such.” These claims don’t sound right to me. By Welty’s own lights, the second can’t be right unless God is part of the universe—but surely Welty thinks that God is the creator of the universe, and hence no part of it. And the first seems to entail that the actual world is merely a representation of the actual world—an unacceptable, because incoherent, consequence. If there are possible worlds, it seems very implausible to suppose that they are merely “representations.”

Welty claims that there is no reason why divine thoughts cannot supply contents for human thoughts: we are able to have the thoughts we do because God already has those thoughts. I think that many theists will not be happy with this. On the one hand, it seems to undermine notions of qualitative difference between us and God. On the other hand, it threatens to lead to the attribution to God of inappropriate thoughts: bawdy thoughts, banal thoughts, malicious thoughts, silly thoughts, and so forth.

Suppose that we agree with Welty that propositions and possible worlds are divine thoughts. In order for propositions and possible worlds to be necessary, it must then be that God could not have had different thoughts. But why not? If there is no independent reality to which divine thoughts must conform, why is it the case that God could not have had different thoughts (providing for different propositions and possible worlds)? Moreover, what are we to make of modal claims about God

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