France and Britain, 1900-1940 by P. M. H. Bell

Author:P. M. H. Bell [Bell, P. M. H.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Europe, Great Britain, General, France, Modern, 20th Century
ISBN: 9781317892731
Google: mr-OAwAAQBAJ
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2014-05-12T16:03:51+00:00

Occupation of the Ruhr

At this stage, in December 1922, Poincaré decided to act without the British. He determined upon the military occupation of the Ruhr, a course which he had been considering since October, and for which plans had been prepared in 1921. He proposed to make this move on the next occasion when Germany failed to make a specific reparation payment. The opportunity arose at a meeting of the Reparations Commission on 26 December 1922. The Commission noted that Germany had not made certain deliveries of timber which had been due in September, and resolved by a majority of 3—1 that Germany was therefore in default and subject to sanctions under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. The majority was made up of France, Belgium and Italy. The British representative voted against.

The Commission thus declared Germany to be in default. It was then for governments to decide what to do about it. At a conference in Paris on 2 January 1923 France proposed the occupation of the Ruhr. Belgium and Italy agreed. The British Prime Minister, Bonar Law, protested against this decision and refused to take part in the occupation. The other three went ahead, and the occupation of the Ruhr began on 11 January 1923. The moving spirit in this action was of course France, and the great majority of the troops involved were French; but it was of considerable psychological and political importance that Belgium and Italy also took part, by sending troops and technicians respectively.

It is not absolutely clear what either the French or the British government thought that it was doing. The most learned French historian of this episode, Jacques Bariéty, after careful scrutiny of the archives, was unable to decide whether Poincaré was simply determined to compel the Germans to make the payments which they had not been making, and to extract the coal which the Germans had not been handing over; or whether he also envisaged detaching the Rhineland, as indicated by French encouragement to separatist movements in the autumn of 1923. It may well be that he simply wished to teach the Germans a lesson and exact reparations by force; if other things followed, well and good. As for the British, the government knew what it did not want: it did not want to enforce reparation payments, and did not wish others to do so either. But as for positive action, they were uncertain. Economic interests pointed in different directions: the British coal industry would gain from a dislocation in German coal production, but the consequences of a widespread disruption of the German economy would be dangerous. Politically, Britain still needed French support over the Turkish question, and did not wish to provoke a complete breach. There was no wish whatever to risk an armed confrontation between British and French troops in Germany. In effect, the British dissociated themselves from the occupation, but went no further; and they did not question the legality of the French action under the terms of the treaty.

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