Battle of Mont St Quentin Peronne 1918 by Michele Bomford

Author:Michele Bomford [Bomford Michele]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781921941962
Publisher: Big Sky Publishing
Published: 2014-09-14T16:00:00+00:00

Major General Charles Rosenthal, commanding the 2nd Division. (AWM H19207)

The 5th Brigade was certainly under the impression that the 6th Brigade would move through on the afternoon of 31 August, initially at 2.00 pm and later at 5.00 pm, and eagerly awaited these reinforcements. An earlier deployment of the 6th in the morning may have alleviated some of the difficulties on the right flank allowing both the 5th and the 6th to carry out their exploitation orders, the men of the 5th believing they could have pushed on much further had they sufficient men. Instead, any exploitation was impossible and they were forced to fall back from their objectives. Had the 5th Brigade been reinforced on 31 August, the battle for Mont St Quentin-Péronne could have been shortened, the objectives taken sooner, and fewer casualties suffered as a result.

At 3.30 pm, Charles Rosenthal told James Robertson by telephone that his brigade must take over from the 5th Brigade before nightfall and establish a line well east of Feuillaucourt and Mont St Quentin so as to be in a good position to advance on the morning of 1 September. However, brigade telephone lines to the battalions were down until 4.00 pm and, in his after action report, Robertson commented on the difficulties of maintaining communications, with the extraordinarily long surface lines continually cut by machine-gun and shell fire.

At 4.15 pm, Robertson issued Instruction No 1 Series A which directed his four battalions to capture the Bussu-Haut-Allaines road, including both villages, before moving to a long trench system running from the Canal du Nord, east of Aizecourt-le-Haut and east of Bussu, a huge and unrealistic objective.

However, at 4.00 pm, with the telephone lines back up, the 24th Battalion commander, William James, advised Robertson that such an attack was impossible until the ground from which it would be launched was cleared. At this point the brigadier went forward to see the situation for himself — braving Rosenthal’s displeasure at leaving his headquarters and placing himself in great danger — and he modified the plan, showing admirable flexibility in attempting to achieve Monash’s intention. At some unspecified zero hour the 24th Battalion would attack Mont St Quentin, which he now believed the 5th Brigade had lost, while the 23rd Battalion, line right, and the 21st Battalion, line left, would clear the ground between Mont St Quentin and Péronne. Robertson advised Rosenthal of the situation by telephone at around 7.00 pm and, until that point, the divisional commander appeared unaware that the 5th Brigade had been pushed off the Mont and out of Feuillaucourt. He reiterated that the 6th and 14th brigades must push on that night and establish the line east of Feuillaucourt, Mont St Quentin and St Denis.

By mid-afternoon it must have been apparent to Rosenthal that the battle was not unfolding as he had anticipated in the morning. However, unless he left his headquarters at Cappy and went forward himself, he would be forced to rely on the intelligence he received from subordinate commanders.

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