Australia's Defence Strategy: Evaluating Alternatives for a Contested Asia by Adam Lockyer

Author:Adam Lockyer [Lockyer, Adam]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Strategy, Military, Political Science, History, Security (National & International)
ISBN: 9780522869330
Google: mIo7DgAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 33847184
Publisher: MUP Academic
Published: 2017-01-30T00:00:00+00:00

Initially, the primary role of the Strategic Reserve was to respond to external conventional threats to Malaya, usually thought to be China.61 This defence strategy focused on massing forces in the Kra Isthmus region of the Malay Peninsula. The Kra Isthmus is only 44 kilometres wide and the narrowest chokepoint on the peninsula.62 The Kraburi River, along with a number of its estuaries and the end of the Tenasserim range, dominate the terrain. A well-prepared defender could use the terrain to great advantage. At the outbreak of war, the Strategic Reserve in Malaya would immediately be sent north to the Kra Isthmus to establish defensive positions, while reinforcements were raised and deployed from the source nations.

The defence strategy envisaged a static positional defence akin to the type applied in Cold War Europe and on the Korean Peninsula. As an Australian defence strategy, it clearly signalled to an opponent where the most valued strategic interests lay. The 1947 Appreciation paper identified the Kra Isthmus as the ‘danger line for hostile penetration’,63 adding that it was therefore the ‘minimum Northern limit of the Australian Zone of Strategic Responsibility’.64 The 1956 Strategic Basis report continued to emphasise the Kra Isthmus as a key Australia strategic interest, arguing: ‘In the event of the political or military failure of SEATO to defend Thailand, contingency plans would be implemented to defend a position on the border of Malaya or to the north in the Kra Isthmus which provides the best natural defensive positions.’65 The Kra Isthmus was not only a geostrategic chokepoint but also the best location to unite with and operate alongside British, US and Commonwealth forces.66

The other members of ANZAM also recognised the strategic importance of the Kra Isthmus. In 1953, the British chiefs of staff announced that ‘it would be necessary to occupy the Songkhla position near the Kra Isthmus in southern Thailand if Siam succumbed to communism’.67 The British judged that if Thailand were occupied by communist troops, Malaya would not be directly threatened for at least six months.68 Within this time, the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in Malaya would rush north to secure the Kra Isthmus. Unlike in the Singapore Strategy, however, the British were forthright in declaring that they would not send reinforcements to Malaya in a case of global war.69 The British were convinced that Australia was a reliable partner in the defence of Malaya. David Lee observed that following military talks in Melbourne in 1953, British Field Marshal Sir John Harding, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, concluded that ‘as long as Australia saw any threat to its security beginning in the Far East, it would never agree to send its forces overseas other than to assist in the defence of Malaya’.70 The British therefore favoured Malaya as a defensive point, in part, because they could rely on Australia’s commitment.

Throughout this period, the United States remained unconvinced by Great Britain and Australia’s positional defence strategy. US grand strategy during the Cold War employed the dual concepts of ‘strongpoint’ containment,

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