What Stalin Knew by Murphy David E

Author:Murphy, David E.
Language: eng
Format: epub

of 102 divisions were deployed in the ‘ West’’ (not further defined), seventy-

two in the ‘‘East,’’ twenty-two in the ‘‘Southeast,’’ and thirty in the reserve.

As of March 1, 1941, the number of divisions in the ‘ West’’ were reduced to

ninety-two, those in the ‘‘East’’ to sixty-one, while those in the ‘‘Southeast’’

had risen to sixty-two. The number carried in the reserves fell to thirteen.

Thirty-five newly created divisions were noted in the second section of the

chart but not located. These numbers and locations reinforced Stalin’s

view that England remained Hitler’s primary concern; that is why in 1940

45 percent of all German divisions were located in the ‘‘West’’ and why in

1941 40 percent were still located there. As for the ‘‘Southeast,’’ the number

of divisions deployed there rose by forty-two. This increase probably con-

firmed Stalin’s conviction that the main German axis of attack would be

south of the Pripet Marshes and into Ukraine. He was, of course, wrong.

The main German thrust came north of the Pripet.26

The March 11 report also stated that the number of German military

aircraft had nearly doubled since October 1, 1940, to 10,980. Here again

Stalin’s fixation with England is reflected. Whereas in October 1940, the

Luftwaffe carried 4,000 aircraft in the ‘ West,’’ by March 1, 1941, the num-

ber had reached 8,030. According to the March 11 report, there were only

700 German aircraft on the Soviet border on March 1, the same number as

in September 1940. The remainder of the March 11 study discussed im-

provements and modernization of aircraft, tanks, and antitank and long-

range artillery. It also concluded that the Germans had the capability to

employ chemical weapons, having acquired new chemical shells from cap-

tured Czech stocks and possessing ample protective gear for their own

troops. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this primarily technical

report is its comment on a German program for the construction of for-

tifications paralleling the Soviet frontier with the Government General.

This work began soon after the Polish defeat and the fixing of the new

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GOLIKOV AND OPERATION SEA LION

border in 1939. The report found that ‘‘despite the intensive character of

the work on fortifications . . . all are still under construction and will take at

least a year to complete.’’27

On March 20, 1941, Golikov signed a document entitled ‘‘Opinions on

the Organizational Measures and Variations of Combat Actions of the Ger-

man Army against the USSR,’’ which he distributed to the defense com-

missar, the Council of People’s Commissars (SNK), and the Central Com-

mittee of the VKP(b). Unlike the special reports from the RU that he

signed, this study was a doklad, a formal publication that was supposed to

represent all the information available on a specific subject. Unfortunately,

the document is highly slanted. It began: ‘ The majority of agent reports

concerning the possibility of war with the USSR in the spring of 1941 come

from Anglo-American sources, the goal of which at present is without a doubt

to worsen relations between the USSR and Germany. ’ Golikov underscored

this and other sentences (shown in italics), apparently to appeal to Sta-

lin’s suspicious, conspiratorial nature and his conviction that the Anglo-

Americans wished either to

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