Waterloo, Volume I by John Hussey

Author:John Hussey [John Hussey]
Language: eng
Format: epub

IX

One of the questions about 15 June is whether Napoleon intended to capture Quatre Bras – and for that matter, Sombreffe (beyond Fleurus). It was claimed in Gourgaud’s Campaign 0f 1815 that Napoleon gave verbal orders for Ney to go beyond Quatre Bras. This is supported by the Bulletin issued at 9 p.m. that same evening and sent to Paris: ‘The Emperor gave the command of the left to the Prince of the Moskova, who at nightfall had his HQ at Quatre Bras on the road to Brussels.’³⁷ While it has been argued that Napoleon’s bulletins were always full of lies and therefore that this was another deliberate untruth, there seems no good reason to lie on this particular (and almost incidental) matter; the Bulletin was composed just at the time Lefebvre-Desnouettes was writing his report for Ney, so that there was no certain news at headquarters. But what must have been known at headquarters was this. Either Ney had been told to attempt to take Quatre Bras – in which case the Bulletin’s remark at least makes some sense; or he had been told nothing at all or even told not to attempt to take Quatre Bras, in which case the Bulletin remark does not make sense. After all, if Gosselies could be taken by mid-afternoon, then Frasnes and Quatre Bras might just be attainable that evening.

Moreover, the strategical significance of Quatre Bras on the road from Nivelles to Namur was self-evident. If taken, the principal link between the two Allied armies would be cut, rendering it more difficult for Wellington to come to Blücher’s support at Sombreffe, but even if the French advance had stopped at Frasnes, 2 miles short of the crossroads, it nonetheless made use of the crossroads very problematical for any Allied force trying to reach Sombreffe.

To a man of Ney’s energy such a prize need not be unattainable, and Ney was personally present among the leading infantry to see what could be done. It is likely that he found the leading units wilting under the strain of the long day, and decided instead to chance a last dash with the élite Garde light cavalry under Lefebvre-Desnouettes. To speed them on he ordered them to leave behind their artillery, but he managed to deploy a battalion of light infantry to follow behind and, he probably hoped, consolidate the position, once taken. Lefebvre-Desnouettes’s report to Ney states that he only just failed ‘to seize it’ and would try again in the morning. That seems conclusive evidence. And furthermore, in his instructions to Ney early on the 16th the Emperor made no criticism of the failure to capture the crossroads the previous evening, merely emphasising their importance in the schemes for this new day.

It seems reasonable to conclude therefore that the capture of Quatre Bras was highly desirable but not indispensable on the 15th. But against that it could be argued that if Quatre Bras was known to be in French hands, Napoleon would find that Blücher

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