Virtue Epistemology Naturalized by Abrol Fairweather

Author:Abrol Fairweather
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Springer International Publishing, Cham

2 The Problem

Plausible as they are, the four principles together lead to a contradiction, as shown by the following argument. We start by assuming that Inductivism is true: 1. S is justified in believing p on the basis of some evidence, and S’s total evidence e doesn’t entail p. (Inductivism)

Suppose then that S knows that p entails not-e or p and on that basis competently deduces not-e or p from p. We are therefore sidestepping issues having to do with our failure to be logically omniscient. Those issues are of course legitimate ones, but the answer to our problem could hardly be that we are ignorant of the relevant entailments. Given closure, then, we have: 2. S is justified in believing not-e or p. (1, Closure)

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