Two Arguments for the Identity of Indiscernibles by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra;

Author:Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra; [Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780192692344
Publisher: Oxford University Press USA
Published: 2022-08-11T00:00:00+00:00

Two Arguments for the Identity of Indiscernibles. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Oxford University Press. © Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra 2022. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192866868.003.0004

1 Thus, bare particulars have properties, despite the common assertion that they don’t. That they have properties on my conception of properties as predicable conditions should be obvious. But even on a conception of properties as concrete universals they should be conceived as having properties. Indeed, discussing bare particulars in the context of such a theory of universals, Sider argues that bare particulars may be red, round, and juicy (Sider 2006: 388). Of course, having such universals would make bare particulars concrete objects, while I am here assuming, for the sake of argument, that they are abstract objects. Despite this difference, the point stands: bare particulars have properties.

2 Must the spheres have parts? A world like Black’s but in which the spheres are extended simples seems to be a possible one. In fact, I have argued that one of Leibniz’s arguments for the Identity of Indiscernibles fails precisely because the argument is unable to rule out a world like Black’s containing two simple indiscernible objects, whether or not they are extended indiscernible simples (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2014: 108–16). Now, since extended simples are more controversial than extended complexes, the difference in dialectical situation is a relevant difference. If one is trying to refute an argument for a version of the Identity of Indiscernibles, which is what I was trying to do in the book on Leibniz I just cited, it is sufficient to appeal to a world of simples, leaving open whether such simples are extended; but if one is trying to establish the falsity of a version of the Identity of Indiscernibles, which is what I shall do in the next chapter, one should aspire to more than merely assuming the possibility of extended simples and then establish the possibility of a world with two indiscernible extended simples. Thus, I shall establish the possibility of a world with two indiscernible complex spheres, spheres having proper parts.

3 That the spheres in Black’s world do not bear any causal relations to each other is not essential to the philosophical significance of Black’s world, namely refuting PIIa. The spheres could be causally related to each other in several ways, provided they were symmetrically causally related and neither was causally related to itself in a way the other one was not causally related to itself—in that case no difference in pure properties would arise from these causal relations. But note that if the spheres are causally related, causation must be a primitive relation, not accountable in terms of differences in pure properties or spatiotemporal relations. For a discussion of primitive causation relevant to the present topic, see Audi 2011.

4 Three clarificatory points. First, although Goodman speaks of qualitative properties rather than pure properties, his qualitative properties are my pure properties (see Goodman 2015: 1, fn. 1). Second, Goodman assumes that the spheres in Black’s world are orbiting each other, and so the property he considers is being a

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