True Enough by Catherine Z. Elgin

Author:Catherine Z. Elgin
Language: eng
Format: epub, pdf
Tags: philosophy; science; epistemology; understanding; knowledge; knowing; art; truth; theory of knowledge; comprehension
Publisher: The MIT Press

Procedural Objectivity

Still, it is clear that in some sense scientific claims are objective. Following Arthur Fine (1998) and Heather Douglas (2004), I suggest that the sort of objectivity we seek is procedural. In the first instance, then, it is procedures that are objective. Findings are objective because they result from or are confirmed by objective procedures. Objective procedures are epistemically valuable because they promote trustworthiness. They are devised, tested, and certified by epistemic communities, who understand their domains, their disciplines, and the available and appropriate means for investigating the phenomena. Objectivity emerges from the self-reflective activities of epistemic communities. It is neither mere correlation of an opinion with mind-independent facts nor a matter of pure consensus. Procedural objectivity is nonconsequentialist. The objectivity of procedures is logically prior to the objectivity of their objects. What justifies calling a particular result objective is that it is the product of an objective procedure.

Trustworthiness might seem to derive from a source. Being someone of great moral and intellectual integrity, Bill would neither lie nor intentionally mislead nor convey epistemically dubious information about an important topic. He would not assert that p unless he was and took himself to be in a position to back up his claim. Nevertheless, his integrity is not enough to make him worthy of confidence. For Joan to responsibly take his word that p, she needs to know or reasonably believe that he is a man of integrity. But we live in a world populated by strangers. We do not personally know everyone whose opinions we might—indeed, must—draw on. Some are trustworthy; some are dishonest; some are unduly cavalier in forming their views; some are careless in conveying them. Often we do not know whom to trust.

To alleviate this problem, we devise and deploy procedures whose outputs are worthy of confidence. If such procedures are properly carried out, their results are trustworthy, regardless of the moral and/or intellectual character of the performer. A postage scale affords excellent reason to think that the envelope weighs 0.5 oz. no matter who is doing the weighing. The results of Marsh’s test afford excellent reason to think that a substance contains arsenic so long as a competent chemist performs the test. Such procedures, rather than the particular individuals who perform them, are the sources of trustworthiness (Fine, 1998; Douglas, 2004). The point is not that the procedures are reliable; it is that we have good reason to trust them. They have been devised, calibrated, and validated to satisfy the standards of a realm of epistemic ends.

Objectivity, so understood, is not equivalent to and does not ensure truth. Hal’s jingoistic conviction that his American car gets better mileage than his neighbor’s foreign car may in fact be true; but his opinion is not objective, since his reasons are political rather than automotive. Nor is Fred’s true belief that his investments lost value today, since his conviction is grounded in his horoscope rather than up-to-date economic information. Nor is Maria’s belief that there are more Muslims than Christians, based as it is on a coin flip.

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