The Troubled Alliance by Silberstein Gerard E.;

Author:Silberstein, Gerard E.; [Silberstein, Gerard E.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: University Press of Kentucky
Published: 2021-12-15T00:00:00+00:00

Berchtold replied immediately and in very certain terms. Austria-Hungary had entered the war to “guarantee its integrity.” If the Monarchy was now to be dismembered there was no sense in expending further blood and money and they might as well give their “hungry neighbors” the territories they demanded without a blow in defense. Furthermore, if Rumania was given the areas it wanted, Austria would be humiliated and Bukarest would demand even more.10 Berchtold, fitting the Rumanian problem into the broader diplomatic context, asserted that if concessions were granted, it would also be the signal for Italy to make analogous territorial demands. For Austria to give up two provinces, or substantial parts of them, before any decisive battles had been fought, would demonstrate that Austria was unsure of its wartime capabilities. This would lead to doubts not only in Rumania, but also in Turkey and Bulgaria, would eliminate the possibility of Turkish-Bulgarian cooperation, and thus would only increase the striking power of the Russian forces against Germany and Austria-Hungary. The foreign minister concluded, “We do not underrate, certainly, the significance of Rumania’s position, but we do not see under present conditions any clear way to swing Rumania from an ambiguous policy which involves no risk for Rumania and offers the possibilities of its reaping advantages by entering at a decisive turn.”11

Behind Berchtold’s strong reaction lay the attitude of Count Stephan Tisza, prime minister of Hungary. In the words of Czernin, Tisza was a man who “stood in awe of nothing and nobody” and who as a Magyar “knew no patriotism except that of Hungary.” Aside from the leading political position he held within the Dual Monarchy, Tisza would under any circumstance have been a man to reckon with. He has been described as one possessed of an almost brutal will and with a psychological makeup as “cold as a sword blade.” People both admired and hated him, though he hardly cared one way or the other. All his energies were directed toward one goal—the furtherance of Hungary—and most certainly this goal could only be compromised by giving up Magyar territory. The areas now in question lay under Hungarian control, and under Hungarian control they would remain. Tisza refused to concede one meter of ground, particularly in light of the fact that Rumania had offered no guarantee whatsoever that it would march against the Russians if the concessions were granted. Furthermore, he said, Rumanian desires with respect to the autonomy of Transylvania and the ceding of the Bukovina had been presented only in the form of diplomatic feelers; Tisza was unwilling even to consider what cessions might be made until the Rumanians submitted concrete conditions under which they would agree to cooperation. He was ready to make a binding statement concerning the Transylvanian Rumanians, but only after Rumania declared war on Russia, and not before.12

The German chancellor proved most impatient with the attitude of Berchtold and Tisza. His answer to Tschirschky declared that the Austrian position would be understandable if the Monarchy were strong enough to handle Russia militarily.

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